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Abstract
Over the past two decades, fair resource allocation problems have received considerable attention in
a variety of application areas. However, little progress has been made in the design of distributed algo-
rithms with convergence guarantees for general and commonly used α-fair allocations. In this paper,
we study weighted α-fair packing problems, that is, the problems of maximizing the objective functions
(i) ∑j wjx1−αj /(1 − α) when α > 0, α 6= 1 and (ii) ∑j wj lnxj when α = 1, over linear constraints
Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0, where wj are positive weights and A and b are non-negative. We consider the dis-
tributed computation model that was used for packing linear programs and network utility maximization
problems. Under this model, we provide a distributed algorithm for general α that converges to an
ε−approximate solution in time (number of distributed iterations) that has an inverse polynomial depen-
dence on the approximation parameter ε and poly-logarithmic dependence on the problem size. This
is the first distributed algorithm for weighted α−fair packing with poly-logarithmic convergence in the
input size. The algorithm uses simple local update rules and is stateless (namely, it allows asynchronous
updates, is self-stabilizing, and allows incremental and local adjustments). We also obtain a number of
structural results that characterize α−fair allocations as the value of α is varied. These results deepen
our understanding of fairness guarantees in α−fair packing allocations, and also provide insight into the
behavior of α−fair allocations in the asymptotic cases α→ 0, α→ 1, and α→∞.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, fair resource allocation problems have received considerable attention in many
application areas, including Internet congestion control [32], rate control in software defined networks [35],
scheduling in wireless networks [46], multi-resource allocation and scheduling in datacenters [12,20,21,24],
and a variety of applications in operations research, economics, and game theory [11, 23]. In most of these
applications, positive linear (packing) constraints arise as a natural model of the allowable allocations.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of finding an α-fair vector on the set determined by packing
constraints Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0 where all Aij ≥ 0.1 We refer to this problem as α−fair packing. For a vector
of positive weights w and α ≥ 0, an allocation vector x∗ of size n is weighted α-fair, if for any alternative
feasible vector x:
∑
j wj
xj−x∗j
(x∗j )
α ≤ 0 [38]. For a compact and convex feasible region, x∗ can be equivalently
defined as a vector that solves the problem of maximizing pα(x) =
∑
j wjfα(xj) [38], where:
fα(xj) =
{
ln(xj), if α = 1
x1−αj
1−α , if α 6= 1
. (1)
α-fairness provides a trade-off between efficiency (sum of allocated resources) and fairness (minimum al-
located resource) as a function of α: the higher the α, the better the fairness guarantees and the lower
the efficiency [4, 11, 31]. Important special cases are proportional fairness (α = 1) and max-min fairness
(α→∞). When α = 0, we have the “unfair” case of linear optimization.
Distributed algorithms for α−fair packing are of particular interest, as many applications are inherently
distributed (such as, e.g., network congestion control), while in others parallelization is highly desirable due
to the large problem size (as in, e.g., resource allocation in datacenters). We adopt the model of distributed
computation commonly used in the design of packing linear programming (LP) algorithms [3,7,8,29,33,42]
and which generalizes the model from network congestion control [26]. In this model, an agent j controls
the variable xj and has information about: (i) the jth column of the m×n constraint matrix A, (ii) the weight
wj , (iii) upper bounds on the global problem parameters m,n,wmax, and Amax, where wmax = maxj wj ,
and Amax = maxij Aij , and (iv) in each round, the relative slack of each constraint i in which xj takes part.
Distributed algorithms for α−fair resource allocations have been most widely studied in the network
congestion control literature, using a control-theoretic approach [25, 26, 32, 38, 41, 46]. Such an approach
yields continuous-time algorithms that converge after “finite” time; however, the convergence time of these
algorithms as a function of the input size is poorly understood. Some other distributed pseudo-polynomial-
time approximation algorithms that can address α-fair packing are described in Table 1. These algorithms
all have convergence times that are at least linear in the parameters describing the problem.
No previous work has given truly fast (poly-log iterations) distributed algorithms for the general case of
α-fair packing. Only for the unfair α = 0 case (packing LPs), are such algorithms known [3,7,8,29,33,47].
Our Results. We provide the first efficient, distributed, and stateless algorithm for weighted α-fair
packing, namely, for the problem max{pα(x) : Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0}, where distributed agents update the values
of xj’s asynchronously and react only to the current state of the constraints. We assume that all non-zero
entries Aij of matrix A satisfy Aij ≥ 1. Considering such a normalized form of the problem is without loss
of generality (see Appendix A).
The approximation provided by the algorithm, to which we refer as the ε-approximation, is (i) (1 +
ε)-multiplicative for α 6= 1, and (ii) Wε-additive2 for α = 1, where W = ∑j wj . The main results
are summarized in the following theorem, where, to unify the statement of the results, we treat α as a
1Although in the network congestion control literature the constraint matrix A is commonly assumed to be a 0-1 matrix [25,
26, 32, 38, 41, 46], important applications (such as, e.g., multi-resource allocation in datacenters) are modeled by a more general
constraint matrix A with arbitrary non-negative elements [12, 20, 21, 24].
2Note that W cannot be avoided here, as additive approximation is not invariant to the scaling of the objective.
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constant that is either equal to 1 or bounded away from 0 and 1, and we also loosen the bound in terms of
ε−1, n,m,Rw = maxj,k wj/wk, and Amax. For a more detailed statement, see Theorems 4.1 – 4.3.
Theorem 1.1. (Main Result) For a given weighted α-fair packing problem max{∑j wjfα(xj) : Ax ≤
1, x ≥ 0}, where fα(xj) is given by (1), there exists a stateless and distributed algorithm (α-FAIRPSOLVER)
that computes an ε-approximate solution in O(ε−5 ln4(RwnmAmaxε−1)) rounds.
To the best of our knowledge, for any constant approximation parameter ε, our algorithm is the first
distributed algorithm for weighted α-fair packing problems with a poly-logarithmic convergence time.
The algorithm is stateless according to the definition given by Awerbuch and Khandekar [6, 7]: it starts
from any initial state, the agents update the variables xj in a cooperative but uncoordinated manner, re-
acting only to the current state of the constraints that they observe, and without access to a global clock.
Statelessness implies various desirable properties of a distributed algorithm, such as: asynchronous updates,
self-stabilization, and incremental and local adjustments [6, 7].
We also obtain the following structural results that characterize α−fair packing allocations as a function
of the value of α:
• We derive a lower bound on the minimum coordinate of the α−fair packing allocation as a function of α
and the problem parameters (Lemma 4.29). This bound deepens our understanding of how the fairness (a
minimum allocated value) changes with α.
• We prove that for α ≤ ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) , α−fair packing can be O(ε)−approximated by any ε−approximation
packing LP solver (Lemma 4.30). This result allows us to focus on the α > ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) cases.
• We show that for |α − 1| = O(ε2/ln2(ε−1RwmnAmax)), α−fair allocation is ε−approximated by a
1−fair allocation returned by our algorithm (Lemmas 4.31 and 4.32).
• We show that for α ≥ ln(RwnAmax)/ε, the α−fair packing allocation x∗ and the max-min fair allocation
z∗ are ε-close to each other: (1 − ε)z∗ ≤ x∗ ≤ (1 + ε)z∗ element-wise. This result is especially
interesting as (i) max-min fair packing is not a convex problem, but rather a multi-objective problem (see,
e.g., [27,44]) and (ii) the result yields the first convex relaxation of max-min fair allocation problems with
a 1± ε gap.
We now overview some of the main technical details of α-FAIRPSOLVER. In doing so, we point out
connections to the two main bodies of previous work, from packing LPs [7] and network congestion control
[25]. We also outline the new algorithmic ideas and proofs that were needed to obtain the results.
The algorithm and KKT conditions. The algorithm maintains primal and dual feasible solutions and
updates each primal variable xj whenever a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition xjα
∑
i yiAij = wj is
not approximately satisfied. In previous work, relevant update rules include: [25] (for α = 1), where the
update of each variable xj is proportional to the difference wj − xjα
∑
i yiAij , and [7] (for α = 0), where
each xj is updated by a multiplicative factor 1± β, whenever xjα
∑
i yiAij = wj is not approximately sat-
isfied. For our techniques (addressing a general α) such rules do not suffice and we introduce the following
modifications: (i) in the α < 1 case we use multiplicative updates by factors (1 + β1) and (1 − β2), where
β1 6= β2 and (ii) we use additional threshold values δj to make sure that xj’s do not become too small. These
thresholds guarantee that we maintain a feasible solution, but they significantly complicate (compared to the
linear case) the argument that each step makes a significant progress.
Dual Variables. In α-FAIRPSOLVER, a dual variable yi is an exponential function of the ith con-
straint’s relative slack: yi(x) = C · eκ(
∑
j Aijxj−1), where C and κ are functions of global input parameters
α,wmax, n,m, and Amax. Packing LP algorithms [3, 7, 8, 17, 18, 28, 43] use similar dual variables with
C = 1. Our work requires choosing C to be a function of α,wmax, n,m,Amax rather than a constant.
2
Paper Number of Distributed Iterations3 Statelessness Notes
[15] Ω(ε−1nAmax) Semi-stateless4 Only for α = 1
[9] Ω(ε−1mnAmax2) Not stateless
[39] poly(ε−1,m, n,Amax) Semi-stateless
[this work] O(ε−5ln4(RwmnAmax/ε)) Stateless
Table 1: Comparison among distributed algorithms for α−fair packing.
Convergence Argument. The convergence analysis of α-FAIRPSOLVER relies on the appropriately
chosen concave potential function that is bounded below and above for xj ∈ [δj , 1], ∀j, and that increases
with every primal update. The algorithm can also be interpreted as a gradient ascent on a regularized
objective function (the potential function), using a generalized entropy regularizer (see [1, 3]). A similar
potential function was used in many works on packing and covering linear programs, such as, e.g., in [7]
and (implicitly) in [47]. The Lyapunov function from [25] is also equivalent to this potential function when
yi(x) = C · eκ(
∑
j Aijxj−1), ∀i. As in these works, the main idea in the analysis is to show that whenever
a solution x is not “close” to the optimal one, the potential function increases substantially. However, our
work requires several new ideas in the convergence proofs, the most notable being stationary rounds. A
stationary round is roughly a time when the variables xj do not change much and are close to the optimum.
Poly-logarithmic convergence time is then obtained by showing that: (i) there is at most a poly-logarithmic
number of non-stationary rounds where the potential function increases additively and the increase is “large
enough”, and (ii) in all the remaining non-stationary rounds, the potential function increases multiplicatively.
Our use of stationary rounds is new, as is the use of Lagrangian duality and all the arguments that follow.
Relationship to Previous Work. Very little progress has been made in the design of efficient distributed
algorithms for the general class of α-fair objectives. Classical work on distributed rate control algorithms
in the networking literature uses a control-theoretic approach to optimize α-fair objectives. While such an
approach has been extensively studied and applied to various network settings [25, 26, 32, 38, 41, 46], it has
never been proven to have polynomial convergence time (and it is unclear whether such a result can be
established).
Since α-fair objectives are concave, their optimization over a region determined by linear constraints
is solvable in polynomial time in a centralized setting through convex programming (see, e.g., [13, 40]).
Distributed gradient methods for network utility maximization problems, such as e.g., [9,39] summarized in
Table 1, can be employed to address the problem of α-fair packing. However, the convergence times of these
algorithms depend on the dual gradient’s Lipschitz constant to produce good approximations. While [9, 39]
provide a better dependence on the accuracy ε than our work, the dependence on the dual gradient’s Lipschitz
constant, in general, leads to at least linear convergence time as a function of n, m, and Amax.
As mentioned before, some special cases have been addressed, particularly for max-min fairness (α →
∞) and for packing LPs (α = 0). Relevant work on max-min fairness includes [10,14,22,27,30,34,36], but
none of these works have poly-logarithmic convergence time. There is a long history of interesting work on
packing LPs in both centralized and distributed settings, e.g., [1,3,7,8,18,19,28,29,33,43,47]. Only a few of
these works are stateless, including the packing LP algorithm of Awerbuch and Khandekar [7], flow control
algorithm of Garg and Young [19], and the algorithm of Awerbuch, Azar, and Khandekar [5] for the special
case of load balancing in bipartite graphs. Additionally, the packing LP algorithm of Allen-Zhu and Orecchia
[3] is “semi-stateless”; the lacking property to make it stateless is that it requires synchronous updates. The
α = 1 case of α-fair packing problems is equivalent to the problem of finding an equilibrium allocation
3The convergence times in [9, 15, 39] are not stated only in terms of the input parameters, but also in terms of intermediary
parameters that depend on the problem structure. Stated here are our lowest estimates of the worst-case convergence times.
4A distributed algorithm is semi-stateless, if all the updates depend only on the current state of the constraints, the updates are
performed in a cooperative but non-coordinated manner, and the updates need to be synchronous [3].
3
in Eisenberg-Gale markets with Leontief utilities (see [15]). Similar to the aforementioned algorithms, the
algorithm from [15] converges in time linear in ε−1 but also (at least) linear in the input size (see Table 1).
In terms of the techniques, closest to our work is the work by Awerbuch and Khandekar [7] and we
now highlight the differences compared to this work. Some preliminaries of the convergence proof follow
closely those from [7]: mainly, Lemmas 4.4, 4.6, and 4.9 use similar arguments as corresponding lemmas
in [7]. Some parts of the lemmas lower-bounding the potential increase in α < 1, α = 1, and α > 1 cases
(Lemmas 4.10, 4.16, and 4.22) use similar arguments as [7], however, even those parts require additional
results due to the existence of lower thresholds δj .
The similarity ends here, as the main convergence arguments are different than those used in [7]. In
particular, the convergence argument from [7] relying on stationary intervals cannot be applied in the setting
of α−fair objectives. More details about why this argument cannot be applied and where it fails are provided
in Section 4. As already mentioned, we rely on the appropriately chosen definition of a stationary round.
To show that in a stationary round a solution x is ε−approximate, we use Lagrangian duality and bound the
duality gap through an intricate case analysis. We remark that such an argument could not have been used
in [7], since in the packing LP case there is no guarantee that the solution y is dual-feasible.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the back-
ground. Section 3 describes the algorithm, and Section 4 provides the convergence analysis and structural
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Weighted α-Fair Packing. Consider the following optimization problem with positive linear (packing)
constraints: (Qα) = max{pα(x) ≡
∑n
j=1wjfα(xj) : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0}, where fα(xj) is given by (1), x =
(x1, ..., xn) is the vector of variables, A is an m×nmatrix with non-negative elements, and b = (b1, ..., bm)
is a vector with strictly positive5 elements. We refer to (Qα) as the weighted α-fair packing. The following
definition and lemma introduced by Mo and Walrand [38] characterize weighted α-fair allocations. In the
rest of the paper, we will use the terms weighted α-fair and α-fair interchangeably.
Definition 2.1. [38] Let w = (w1, ..., wn) be a vector with positive entries and α > 0. A vector x∗ =
(x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) is weighted α-fair, if it is feasible and for any other feasible vector x:
∑n
j=1wj
xj−x∗j
x∗j
α ≤ 0.
Lemma 2.2. [38] A vector x∗ solves (Qα) for functions fα(x∗j ) if and only if it is weighted α-fair.
Notice in (Qα) that since bi > 0, ∀i, and the partial derivative of the objective with respect to any of the
variables xj goes to ∞ as xj → 0, the optimal solution must lie in the positive orthant. Moreover, since the
objective is strictly concave and maximized over a convex region, the optimal solution is unique and (Qα)
satisfies strong duality (see, e.g., [13]). The same observations are true for the scaled version of the problem
denoted by (Pα) and introduced in the following subsection.
Normalized Form. We consider the weighted α-fair packing problem in the normalized form:
(Pα) = max
{
pα(x) : Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0
}
,
where pα(x) =
∑n
j=1wjfα(xj), fα is defined by (1), w = (w1, ..., wn) is a vector of positive weights,
x = (x1, ..., xn) is the vector of variables, A is an m×n matrix with non-negative entries, and 1 is a size-m
vector of 1’s. We let Amax denote the maximum element of the constraint matrix A, and assume that every
entry Aij of A is non-negative, and moreover, that Aij ≥ 1 whenever Aij 6= 0. The maximum weight is
denoted by wmax and the minimum weight is denoted by wmin. The sum of the weights is denoted by W and
the ratio wmaxwmin by Rw. We remark that considering problem (Qα) in the normalized form (Pα) is without
loss of generality: any problem (Qα) can be scaled to this form by (i) dividing both sides of each inequality
5If, for some i, bi = 0, then trivially xj = 0, for all j such that Aij 6= 0.
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i by bi and (ii) working with scaled variables c · xj , where c = min{1, min{i,j:Aij 6=0}
Aij
bi
}. Moreover, such
scaling preserves the approximation (A ).
KKT Conditions and Duality Gap We will denote the Lagrange multipliers for (Pα) as y = (y1, ..., ym)
and refer to them as “dual variables”. The KKT conditions for (Pα) are (see Appendix B):
n∑
j=1
Aijxj ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}; xj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} (primal feasibility) (K1)
yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} (dual feasibility) (K2)
yi ·
( m∑
j=1
Aijxj − 1
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} (complementary slackness) (K3)
xj
α
m∑
i=1
yiAij = wj, ∀j ∈ {1, ...,m} (gradient conditions) (K4)
The duality gap for α 6= 1 is (see Appendix B):
Gα(x, y) =
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
ξj
α−1
α − 1)+ m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j · ξj
α−1
α , (2)
where ξj =
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
, while for α = 1:
G1(x, y) = −
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(xj∑mi=1yiAij
wj
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −W. (3)
Model of Distributed Computation We adopt the same model of distributed computation as [3, 7, 8,
29, 33, 42], described as follows. We assume that for each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, there is an agent controlling the
variable xj . Agent j is assumed to have information about the following problem parameters: (i) the jth
column of A, (ii) the weight wj , and (iii) (an upper bound on) m,n,wmax, and Amax. In each round, agent
j collects the relative slack6 1−∑nj=1Aijxj of all constraints i for which Aij 6= 0.
We remark that this model of distributed computation is a generalization of the model considered in
network congestion control problems [26] where a variable xj corresponds to the rate of node j, A is a 0-1
routing matrix, such that Aij = 1 if and only if a node j sends flow over link i, and b is the vector of link
capacities. Under this model, the knowledge about the relative slack of each constraint corresponds to each
node collecting (a function of) congestion on each link that it utilizes. Such a model was used in network
utility maximization problems with α-fair objectives [25] and general strongly-concave objectives [9].
3 Algorithm
The pseudocode for the α-FAIRPSOLVER algorithm that is run at each node j is provided in Fig 1. The
basic intuition is that the algorithm keeps KKT conditions (K1) and (K2) satisfied and works towards (ap-
proximately) satisfying the remaining two KKT conditions (K3) and (K4) to minimize the duality gap. The
algorithm can run in the distributed setting described in Section 2. In each round, an agent j updates the
value of xj based on the relative slack of all the constraints in which j takes part, as long as the KKT con-
dition (K4) of agent j is not approximately satisfied. The updates need not be synchronous: we will require
that all agents make updates at the same speed, but without access to a global clock.
To allow for self-stabilization and dynamic changes, the algorithm runs forever at all the agents, which
is a standard requirement for self-stabilizing algorithms (see, e.g., [16]). The convergence of the algorithm
is measured as the number of rounds between the round in which the algorithm starts from some initial
solution and the round in which it reaches an ε−approximate solution, assuming that there are no hard reset
events or node/constraint insertions/deletions in between.
6The slack is “relative” because in a non-scaled version of the problem where one could have bi 6= 1, agent j would need to
have information about bi−
∑n
j=1 Aijxj
bi
.
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α-FAIRPSOLVER(ε)
(Parameters δj , C, κ, γ, β1, and β2 are set as described in the text below the algorithm.)
In each round of the algorithm:
1: xj ← max{xj , δj}, xj = min{xj , 1}
2: Update the dual variables: yi = C · eκ(
∑
n
j=1 Aijxj−1) ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}
3: if xj
α
·
∑m
i=1
yiAij
wj
≤ (1− γ) then
4: xj ← xj · (1 + β1)
5: else
6: if xj
α
·
∑
m
i=1
yiAij
wj
≥ (1 + γ) then
7: xj ← max{xj · (1− β2), δj}
Figure 1: Pseudocode of α-FAIRPSOLVER algorithm.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the input parameter ε that determines the approximation
quality satisfies ε ≤ min{16 , 910α} for any α, and ε ≤ 1−αα for α < 1. The parameters δj , C, κ, γ, β1, and
β2 are set as follows. For technical reasons (mainly due to reinforcing dominant multiplicative updates of
the variables xj), we set the values of the lower thresholds δj below the actual lower bound of the optimal
solution that we derive in Lemma 4.29:
δj =
(
1
2
· wj
wmax
)1/α
·
{(
1
m·n2·Amax
)1/α
, if 0 < α ≤ 1
1
m·n2Amax2−1/α , if α > 1
.
We denote δmax ≡ maxj δj , δmin ≡ minj δj . The constant C that multiplies the exponent in the dual
variables yi is chosen as C = W∑n
j=1 δj
α . Because δj only depends on wj and on global parameters, we also
have C = wjδjα , ∀j. The parameter κ that appears in the exponent of the yi’s is chosen as κ = 1ε ln
(
CmAmax
εwmin
)
.
The “absolute error” of (K4) γ is set to ε/4. For α ≥ 1, we set β1 = β2 = β, where the choice of β is
described below. For α < 1, we set β1 = β, β2 = β2(ln( 1δmin ))
−1
.
Similar to [7], we choose the value of β so that if we set β1 = β2 = β, in any round the value of each
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
changes by a multiplicative factor of at most (1± γ/4). Since the maximum increase over
any xj in each iteration is by a factor 1 + β, and x is feasible in each round (see Lemma 4.4), we have that∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ 1, and therefore, the maximum increase in each yi is by a factor of eκβ . A similar argument
holds for the maximum decrease. Hence, we choose β so that:
(1 + β)αeκβ ≤ 1 + γ/4 and (1− β)αe−κβ ≥ 1− γ/4,
and it suffices to set:
β =
{
γ
5(κ+1) , if α ≤ 1
γ
5(κ+α) , if α > 1
.
Remark: In the α < 1 cases, since β2 = β2(ln(1/δmin))−1, the maximum decrease in xj
α
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
is by
a factor (1− (γ/4) · β(ln(1/δmin))−1), ∀j.
4 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyze the convergence time of α-FAIRPSOLVER. We first state our main theorems
and provide some general results that hold for all α > 0. We show that starting from an arbitrary solution,
the algorithm reaches a feasible solution within poly-logarithmic (in the input size) number of rounds, and
maintains a feasible solution forever after. Similar to [7, 25, 47], we use a concave potential function that,
for feasible x, is bounded below and above and increases with any algorithm update. Then, we analyze the
convergence time separately for three cases: α < 1, α = 1, and α > 1. With an appropriate definition of a
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stationary round for each of the three cases, we show that in every stationary round, x approximates “well”
the optimal solution by bounding the duality gap. On the other hand, for any non-stationary round, we show
that the potential increases substantially. This large increase in the potential then leads to the conclusion that
there cannot be too many non-stationary rounds, thus bounding the overall convergence time.
We make a few remarks here. First, we require that α be bounded away from zero. This requirement is
without loss of generality because we show that when α ≤ ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) , any ε−approximation LP provides
a 3ε−approximate solution to (Pα) (Lemma 4.30). Thus, when α ≤ ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) we can switch to the
algorithm of [7], and when α > ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) , the convergence time remains poly-logarithmic in the input
size and polynomial in ε−1. Second, the assumption that ε ≤ 1−αα in the α < 1 case is also without
loss of generality, because we show that when α is close to 1 (roughly, 1 − O(ε2/ ln2(RwmnAmax/ε))),
we can approximate (Pα) by switching to the α = 1 case of the algorithm (Lemma 4.31). Finally, when
α > 1, the algorithm achieves an ε−approximation in time O(α4ε−4 ln2(RwnmAmaxε−1)). We believe
that a polynomial dependence on α is difficult to avoid in this setting, because by increasing α, the gradient
of the α-fair utilities fα blows up on the interval (0, 1): as α increases, fα(x) quickly starts approaching a
step function that is equal to −∞ on the interval (0, 1] and equal to 0 on the interval (1,∞]. To characterize
the behavior of α−fair allocations as α becomes large, we show that when α ≥ ε−1ln(RwnAmax), all the
coordinates of the α−fair vector are within a 1± ε multiplicative factor of the corresponding coordinates of
the max-min fair vector (Lemma 4.34).
Finally, we note that the main convergence argument from [7] that uses an appropriate definition of
stationary intervals does not extend to our setting. The proof from [7] “breaks” in the part that shows
that the solution is ε−approximate throughout any stationary interval, stated as Lemma 3.7 in [7]. The
proof of Lemma 3.7 in [7] is by contradiction: assuming that the solution is not ε−approximate, the proof
proceeds by showing that at least one of the variables would increase in each round of the stationary interval,
thus eventually making the solution infeasible and contradicting one of the preliminary lemmas. For α ≥
1, unlike the linear objective in [7], α-fair objectives are negative, and the assumption that the solution
is not ε−approximate does not lead to any conclusive information. For α < 1, adapting the proof of
Lemma 3.7 from [7] leads to the conclusion that for at least one j, in each round t of the stationary interval
(x∗j )
α∑
i yi(x
t)Aij
wj
≤ 1− γ, where x∗ is the optimal solution, and xt is the solution at round t. In [7], where
α = 0, this implies that xj increases in each round of the stationary interval, while in our setting (α > 0) it
is not possible to draw such a conclusion.
Main Results. Our main results are summarized in the following three theorems. The objective is denoted
by pα(x), xt denotes the solution at the beginning of round t, and x∗ denotes the optimal solution.
Theorem 4.1. (Convergence for α < 1) α-FAIRPSOLVER solves (Pα) approximately for α < 1 in time that
is polynomial in ln(nmAmax)αε . In particular, after at most
O
(
α−2ε−5 ln2 (RwmnAmax) ln2
(
ε−1RwmnAmax
)) (4)
rounds, there exists at least one round t such that pα(x∗) − pα(xt) ≤ εpα(xt). Moreover, the total number
of rounds s in which pα(x∗)− pα(xs) > εpα(xs) is also bounded by (4).
Theorem 4.2. (Convergence for α = 1) α-FAIRPSOLVER solves (P1) approximately in time that is poly-
nomial in ε−1 ln(RwnmAmax). In particular, after at most
O
(
ε−5 ln2 (RwnmAmax) ln2
(
ε−1RwnmAmax
)) (5)
rounds, there exists at least one round t such that p(x∗) − p(xt) ≤ εW . Moreover, the total number of
rounds s in which p(x∗)− p(xs) > εW is also bounded by (5).
Theorem 4.3. (Convergence for α > 1) α-FAIRPSOLVER solves (Pα) approximately for α > 1 in time that
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is polynomial in ε−1 ln(nmAmax). In particular, after at most:
O
(
α4ε−4 ln (RwnmAmax) ln
(
ε−1RwnmAmax
)) (6)
rounds, there exists at least one round t such that pα(x∗) − pα(xt) ≤ ε(−pα(xt)). Moreover, the total
number of rounds s in which pα(x∗)− pα(xs) > ε(−pα(xs)) is also bounded by (6).
Feasibility and Approximate Complementary Slackness. The following three lemmas are preliminar-
ies for the convergence time analysis. Lemma 4.4 shows that starting from a feasible solution, the algorithm
always maintains a feasible solution. Lemma 4.5 shows that any violated constraint becomes feasible within
poly-logarithmic number of rounds, and remains feasible forever after. Combined with Lemma 4.4, Lemma
4.5 allows us to focus only on the rounds with feasible solutions x. Lemma 4.6 shows that after a poly-
logarithmic number of rounds, approximate complementary slackness (KKT condition (K3)) holds in an
aggregate sense:
∑m
i=1 yi(x)
(∑n
j=1Aijxj − 1
) ≈ 0.
Lemma 4.4. If the algorithm starts from a feasible solution, then the algorithm maintains a feasible solution
x: xj ≥ 0, ∀j and
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ 1, ∀i, in each round.
Proof. By the statement of the lemma, the solution is feasible initially. From the way that the algorithm
makes updates to the variables xj , it is always true that xj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Now assume that x becomes infeasible in some round, and let x0 denote the (feasible) solution before
that round, x1 denote the (infeasible) solution after the round. We have:
n∑
ℓ=1
Aiℓx
0
ℓ ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}, and
n∑
ℓ=1
Akℓx
1
ℓ > 1, for some k ∈ {1, ...,m}.
For this to be true, x must have increased over at least one coordinate j such that Akj 6= 0. For such a
change to be triggered by the algorithm, it must also be true that:
(x0j)
α
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij ≤ wj (1− γ) .
Since, by the choice of β1 = β, this term can increase by a factor of at most 1 + γ/4, it follows that:
(x1j )
α
m∑
i=1
yi(x
1)Aij ≤ wj(1− γ)
(
1 +
γ
4
)
< wj.
This further implies:
(x1j )
αyk(x
1)Akj < wj ,
and since whenever Akj 6= 0 we also have Akj ≥ 1, we get:
(x1j)
αyk(x
1) < wj. (7)
On the other hand, since x1j ≥ δj , δjα = wjC , and
∑n
j=1Akjx
1
j > 1:
(x1j )
αyk(x
1) ≥ wj
C
· C · eκ(
∑n
j=1 Akjx
1
j−1) > wj ,
which contradicts (7).
Lemma 4.5. If for any i: ∑nj=1Aijxj > 1, then after at most τ1 = O( 1β2 ln(nAmax)) rounds, it is always
true that
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose that ∑nj=1Aijxj > 1 for some i. Then yi > C , and for every xj with Aij 6= 0:
xj
α
m∑
l=1
yl(x)Alj ≥ xjαyi(x)Aij ≥ δjαC ≥ wj > wj(1− γ),
and therefore, none of the variables that appear in i increases.
8
Since
∑n
j=1Aijxj > 1, there exists at least one xk with Aik 6= 0 such that xk ≥
∑n
j=1 Aijxj
Aikn
> 1nAmax .
For each such xk, since C ≥ 2wmaxnAmax:
xk
α
m∑
l=1
yl(x)Alj ≥ C 1
nAmax
≥ 2wmax > wk(1 + γ),
and therefore, xk decreases (by a factor (1 − β2)). As xk ≤ 1, after at most O( 1β2 ln(nAmax)) rounds in
which
∑n
j=1Aijxj > 1, we must have xk ≤ 1nAmax , and therefore,
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ 1.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.4, the constraint i never gets violated again.
Lemma 4.6. If the algorithm starts from a feasible solution, then after at most τ0 = 1β ln
(
1
δmin
)
rounds, it
is always true that:
1. There exists at least one approximately tight constraint: maxi
{∑n
j=1Aijxj
} ≥ 1− (1 + 1/κ)ε,
2.
∑m
i=1 yi ≤ (1 + 3ε)
∑n
j=1 xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij , and
3. (1− 3ε)∑mi=1 yi ≤∑nj=1 xj∑mi=1 yiAij ≤∑mi=1 yi.
Proof. Suppose that maxi
∑n
j=1Aijxj < 1− ε. Then for each yi we have:
yi ≤ C · e−κε = C · εwmin
CmAmax
=
εwmin
mAmax
.
Due to Lemma 4.4, we have that x is feasible in every round, which implies that xj ≤ 1 ∀j. This further
gives:
xj
α
m∑
i=1
yiAij ≤ wjε ≤ wj(1− γ),
and, therefore, all variables xj increase by a factor 1 + β. From Lemma 4.4, since the solution always
remains feasible, none of the variables can increase to a value larger than 1. Therefore, after at most τ0 =
log1+β
(
1
δmax
)
≤ 1β ln
(
1
δmax
)
rounds, there must exist at least one i such that
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≥ 1−ε. If in any
round maxi
∑n
j=1Aijxj decreases, it can decrease by at most β2
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ β
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≤ β < ε5κ .
Therefore, in every subsequent round
max
i
n∑
j=1
Aijxj > 1−
(
1 +
1
5κ
)
ε.
For the second part of the lemma, let S = {i :∑nj=1Aijxj < maxk∈{1,...,m}∑nj=1Akjxj − κ−15κ ε} be
the set of constraints that are at least “κ−15κ ε-looser” than the tightest constraint. Then for i ∈ S we have
yi ≤ e−
κ−1
5
ε max
k∈{1,...,m}
yk <
ε
m
eε/5 max
k∈{1,...,m}
yk < 1.2
ε
m
max
k∈{1,...,m}
yk.
This further gives:
m∑
i=1
yi =
∑
i∈S
yi +
∑
k/∈S
yk < (1 + 1.2ε)
∑
i/∈S
yi.
Moreover, for each i /∈ S we have yi
∑n
j=1Aijxj ≥ (1− 1.2ε)yi, since for i /∈ S:
n∑
j=1
Aijxj ≥ max
k∈{1,...,m}
Akjxj − κ− 1
5κ
ε ≥ 1−
(
1 +
1
5κ
+
κ− 1
5κ
)
ε = 1− 1.2ε.
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Therefore:
m∑
i=1
yi <
1 + 1.2ε
1− 1.2ε
∑
i/∈S
yi
n∑
j=1
Aijxj
≤ (1 + 3ε)
∑
i/∈S
yi
n∑
j=1
Aijxj (from ε ≤ 1/6)
≤ (1 + 3ε)
m∑
i=1
yi
n∑
j=1
Aijxj .
Interchanging the order of summation in the last line, we reach the desired inequality.
The proof of the last part of the lemma follows from feasibility:
∑
j Aijxj ≤ 1, ∀i (Lemma 4.4), and
from 11+3ε ≥ 1− 3ε.
Lemmas analogous to 4.4 and 4.6 also appear in [7]. However, the proofs of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6 require
new ideas compared to the proofs of the corresponding lemmas in [7]. We need to be much more careful
in our choice of lower thresholds δj and constant C in the dual variables, particularly by choosing C as a
function of several variables, rather than as a constant. The choice of δj’s is also sensitive as smaller δj’s
would make the potential function range too large, while larger δj’s would cause more frequent decrease of
“small” variables. In either case, the convergence time would increase.
Decrease of Small Variables. The following lemma is also needed for the convergence analysis. It
shows that if some variable xj decreases by less than a multiplicative factor (1−β2), i.e., xj < δj1−β2 and xj
decreases, then xj must be part of at least one approximately tight constraint. This lemma will be used later
to show that in any round the increase in the potential due to the decrease of “small” variables is dominated
by the decrease of “large” variables (i.e., the variables that decrease by a multiplicative factor (1− β2)).
Lemma 4.7. Consider the rounds that happen after the initial τ1 = O( 1β2 ln(nAmax)) rounds. If in some
round there is a variable xj < δj1−β2 that decreases, then in the same round for some i with Aij 6= 0 it holds
that: yi(x) ≥
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x)
mAmax
and
∑n
k=1Aikxk > 1− ε2 .
Proof. Suppose that some xj < δj1−β2 triggers a decrease over the jth coordinate. The first part of the Lemma
is easy to show, simply by using the argument that at least one term of a summation must be higher than the
average, i.e., there exists at least one i with Aij 6= 0 such that:
yi(x)Aij ≥
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x)
m
⇒ yi ≥
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x)
mAmax
.
For the second part, as xj < δj1−β2 , we have that:
xj
αyi(x) ≥ xj
α
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x)
mAmax
⇒ yi(x) > (1− β2)
α
δj
α
xj
α
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x)
mAmax
.
Since xj decreases, we have that xjα
∑m
l=1 yi(x)Alj ≥ wj(1+γ), and therefore yi(x) > wjδjα
(1+γ)(1−β2)α
mAmax
.
Moreover, as yi(x) = C · eκ(
∑n
k=1Aikxk−1), and C = wjδjα , it follows that:
eκ(
∑n
k=1Aikxk−1) >
(1 + γ)(1− β2)α
mAmax
. (8)
Observe that for α ≤ 1:
(1 + γ)(1− β2)α ≥ (1 + γ)(1− β2) >
(
1 +
ε
4
)(
1− ε
20(κ + 1)
)
> 1 >
√
ε, (9)
10
while for α > 1, since εα ≤ 910 :
(1 + γ)(1 − β2)α ≥ (1 + γ)(1 − αβ2) ≥ (1 + γ)
(
1− γεα
5
)
≥ 1 > √ε, (10)
where we have used the generalized Bernoulli’s inequality for (1 − β2)α ≥ (1 − αβ2) [37], and then
β2 = β =
γ
5(κ+α) <
γε
5 . Recalling that κ =
1
ε
ln
(
CmAmax
εwmin
)
, and combining (8) with (9) and (10):
(
εwmin
CmAmax
) 1−∑nk=1 Aikxk
ε
>
√
ε
mAmax
.
Finally, as C ≥ 2wmaxnmAmax, it follows that wminεCmAmax ≤ εwmin2wmaxnm2Amax2 <
( √
ε
mAmax
)2
< 1, which
gives:
1−∑nk=1Aikxk
ε
<
1
2
⇔
n∑
k=1
Aikxk > 1− ε
2
.
Potential. We use the following potential function to analyze the convergence time:
Φ(x) = pα(x)− 1
κ
m∑
i=1
yi(x),
where pα(x) =
∑n
j=1wjfα(xj) and fα is defined by (1). The potential function is strictly concave and its
partial derivative with respect to any variable xj is:
∂Φ(x)
∂xj
=
wj
xjα
−
m∑
i=1
yi(x)Aij =
wj
xjα
(
1− xj
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
)
. (11)
The following fact (given in a similar form in [7]), which follows directly from the Taylor series repre-
sentation of concave functions, will be useful for the potential increase analysis:
Fact 4.8. For a differentiable concave function f : Rn → R and any two points x0, x1 ∈ Rn:
n∑
j=1
∂f(x0)
∂xj
(x1j − x0j ) ≥ f(x1)− f(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
∂f(x1)
∂xj
(x1j − x0j ).
Using Fact 4.8 and (11), we show the following lemma:
Lemma 4.9. Starting with a feasible solution and throughout the course of the algorithm, the potential
function Φ(x) never decreases. Letting x0 and x1 denote the values of x before and after a round update,
respectively, the potential function increase is lower-bounded as:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
∣∣x1j − x0j ∣∣
(x1j )
α
∣∣∣1− (x1j )α∑mi=1 yi(x1)Aij
wj
∣∣∣.
Proof. Since Φ is concave, using Fact 4.8 and (11) it follows that:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j )
α
(
1− (x
1
j)
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
. (12)
If x1j = x0j , then the term in the summation (12) corresponding to the change in xj is equal to zero, and xj
has no contribution to the sum in (12).
If x1j − x0j > 0, then, as xj increases over the observed round, it must be
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≤ 1 − γ.
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By the choice of the parameters, (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≤ (1 + γ4 )( (x0j )α ∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aijwj ), and therefore
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≤
(
1 +
γ
4
)
(1− γ) = 1− 3
4
γ − γ
2
4
< 1− 3
4
γ. (13)
It follows that 1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
> 34γ > 0, and therefore
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j)
α
(
1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
= wj
∣∣x1j − x0j ∣∣
(x1j )
α
∣∣∣∣∣1− (x1j )α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
∣∣∣∣∣.
Finally, if x1j − x0j < 0, then it must be
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≥ 1 + γ. By the choice of the parameters,
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≥ (1− γ4 ) ( (x0j )α ∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aijwj ), implying
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≥
(
1− γ
4
)
(1 + γ) = 1 +
3
4
γ − γ
2
4
> 1 +
1
2
γ. (14)
We get that 1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
< −12γ < 0, and therefore
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j)
α
(
1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
= wj
∣∣x1j − x0j ∣∣
(x1j )
α
∣∣∣∣∣1− (x1j )α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
completing the proof.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The outline of the proof is as follows. We first derive a lower bound on the potential increase (Lemma 4.10),
which will motivate the definition of a stationary round. Then, for the appropriate definition of a stationary
round we will first show that in any stationary round, solution is O(ε)−approximate. Then, to complete
the proof, we will show in any non-stationary round there is a sufficiently large increase in the potential
function, which, combined with the bounds on the potential value will yield the result.
The following lemma lower-bounds the increase in the potential function in any round of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.10. If α < 1 and Φ(x0), x0, y(x0) and Φ(x1), x1, y(x1) denote the values of Φ, x, and y before
and after a round, respectively, and S− = {j : xj decreases}, then if x0 is feasible:
1. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β2γ/ ln(1/δmin))
∑
j∈S− wj
(x0j )
1−α
1−α ;
2. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β)
(
(1− γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j )1−α −∑mi=1 yi(x0)∑nj=1Aijx0j);
3. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω
(
β2
ln(1/δmin)
)(∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)
∑n
j=1Aijx
0
j − (1 + γ)
∑n
j=1wj(x
0
j )
1−α
)
.
Proof.
Proof of 1. Observe that for j ∈ S−, x1j = max{δj , (1 − β2)x0j}. From the proof of Lemma 4.9, we have
that:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
∑
j∈S−
wj
x0j − x1j
(x1j)
α
(
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
.
The proof that∑
j∈S−
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x1j)
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
= Θ
( ∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β2
}
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
))
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is implied by the proof of part 3 of this lemma (see below). For each j ∈ S−, we have that:(
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
≥ (1 + γ)(1− γ/4) − 1 > γ/2,
Therefore:
Φ(x1)−Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(γ)
∑
j∈S−
wj
β2x
0
j
(1− β2)(x0j )α
= Ω
(
β2γ
1− β2
) ∑
j∈S−
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
.
Proof of 2. Let S+ denote the set of j’s such that xj increases in the current round. Then, recalling that
for j ∈ S+ (x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≤ 1 − γ and that from the choice of parameters (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≤
(1 + γ/4)
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
:
Φ(x1)−Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j)
α
(
1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
≥
∑
j∈S+
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j )
α
(
1− (x
1
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
≥
∑
j∈S+
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j )
α
(
1− (1 + γ/4)(x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
)
≥
∑
j∈S+
wj
x1j − x0j
(x1j )
α
(
(1− γ)− (x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
)
.
Since j ∈ S+, x1j = (1 + β)x0j , it follows that
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β
(1 + β)α
∑
j∈S+
wj(x
0
j)
−α
(
(1− γ)− (x
0
j)
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
)
.
Observing that for any xj /∈ S+ we have that (1− γ)− (x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
< 0, we get:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β
(1 + β)α
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(1− γ)− (x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
)
= Ω(β)
(1− γ) n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j )
1−α −
n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij
 .
Proof of 3. Let S− denote the set of j’s such that xj decreases in the current round. In this case not all the
xj’s with j ∈ S− decrease by a multiplicative factor (1−β2), since for j ∈ S−: x1j = max{(1−β2)x0j , δj}.
We will first lower-bound the potential increase over xj’s that decrease multiplicatively: {j : j ∈ S− ∧
x0j(1 − β2) ≥ δj}, so that x1j = x0j (1 − β2). Recall that for j ∈ S−:
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≥ 1 + γ and
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≥ (1 − γ/4 βln(1/δmin))
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≥ (1 − γ/4) (x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
. It follows
that:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β2
(1− β2)α
∑
{j:j∈S−∧x0j (1−β)≥δj}
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
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≥ β2
∑
{j:j∈S−∧x0j (1−β2)≥δj}
wj(x
0
j)
1−α
(
(1− γ/4)(x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− 1
)
= Ω
( β2
ln(1/δmin)
) ∑
{j:j∈S−∧x0j (1−β2)≥δj}
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
.
(15)
Next, we prove that the potential increase due to decrease of xj such that {j : j ∈ S− ∧ x0j (1 − β2) < δj}
is dominated by the potential increase due to xk’s that decrease multiplicatively by the factor (1− β2).
Choose any xj such that {j : j ∈ S− ∧ x0j(1 − β2) < δj}, and let ξj(x0) =
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1Aljyi(x
0)
wj
. From
Lemma 4.7, there exists at least one i with Aij 6= 0, such that:
yi ≥
wj(x
0
j )
α
wj(x
0
j )
α
·
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
mAmax
>
1
mAmax
wj(1− β2)α
δj
α ξj(x
0) ≥ 1− β2
mAmax
wj
δj
α ξj(x
0), and, (16)
n∑
k=1
Aikx
0
k > 1−
ε
2
. (17)
From (17), there exists at least one p such that Aip 6= 0 and
Aipx
0
p >
1− ε2
n
. (18)
Since x0p ∈ (0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1), using (18), we have that Aip(x0p)α ≥ Aipx0p > 1−
ε
2
n . Recalling (16):
(x0p)
α
m∑
l=1
Alpyl(x
0) ≥ (x0p)αAipyi(x0)
≥ 1−
ε
2
n
· 1− β2
mAmax
wj
δj
α ξj(x
0).
Recalling that wjδjα = C ≥ 2wmaxn2mAmax, it further follows that:
(x0p)
α
m∑
l=1
Alpyl(x
0) ≥ 2
(
1− ε
2
)
(1− β2) · n · wmax · ξj(x0). (19)
Because ε ≤ 16 and β2 < β = γ5(κ+1) = ε20(κ+1) < ε20 , it follows that 2
(
1− ε2
)
(1− β2) > 1. Therefore:
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1Alpyl(x
0)
wp
≥ (x
0
p)
α
∑m
l=1Alpyl(x
0)
wmax
> n · ξj(x0) = n ·
(x0j)
α
∑m
l=1Aljyi(x
0)
wj
. (20)
As α < 1, we have that δjα > δj , and wjδj >
wj
δj
α = C . Similar to (16), we can lower-bound yi as:
yi(x) ≥ 1− β2
mAmax
· wj
δj
· x
0
j
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
>
1− β2
mAmax
· wj
δj
α ·
x0j
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
. (21)
Then, recalling Aipx0p >
1− ε
2
n , and using (21), it is simple to show that:
x0p
∑
l
yl(x
0)Alp > n · x0j
m∑
l=1
Aljyl(x
0). (22)
As ξj(x0) ≥ (1+γ) and x0p > δp1−β2 , it immediately follows from (20) that xp decreases by a factor (1−β2).
In the rest of the proof we show that (20) and (22) imply that the increase in the potential due to the
decrease of variable xp dominates the increase in the potential due to the decrease of variable xj by at least
a factor n. This result then further implies that the increase in the potential due to the decrease of variable
xp dominates the increase in the potential due to the decrease of all small xk’s that appear in the constraint
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i (xk’s are such that Aik 6= 0, x0k < δk1−β2 , and
(x0k)
α
∑
l yl(x)Alk
wk
≥ 1 + γ).
Consider the following two cases: wp(x0p)1−α ≥ (wjx0j )1−α and wp(x0p)1−α < (wjx0j )1−α.
Case 1: wp(x0p)1−α ≥ (wjx0j )1−α. Then, using (20):
wp(x
0
p)
1−α
(
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1Alpyl(x
0)
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ (wjx0j)1−α
(
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1Alpyl(x
0)
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ (wjx0j)1−α
(
n · (x
0
j )
α
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x
0)
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ n · (wjx0j)1−α
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x
0)
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
.
(23)
Case 2: wp(x0p)1−α < (wjx0j )1−α. Then, using (22):
wp(x
0
p)
1−α
(
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1Alpyl(x
0)
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
= x0p
m∑
l=1
Alpyl(x
0)− (1 + γ)wp(x0p)1−α
≥ x0p
m∑
l=1
Alpyl(x
0)− (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
≥ n · x0j
m∑
l=1
Aljyl(x
0)− (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
≥ n · (wjx0j)1−α
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x
0)
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
.
(24)
Combining (23) and (24) with (15), it follows that:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β2)
∑
j∈S−
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x0j)
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
.
Finally, since for j /∈ S−:
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
< 0:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β2)
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x0j)
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
= Ω
( β2
ln(1/δmin)
) n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij − (1 + γ)
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j)
1−α
 ,
completing the proof.
Parts 2 and 3 of Lemma [7] appear in a somewhat similar form in [7]. However, part 3 requires significant
additional results for bounding the potential change due to decrease of small xj’s (i.e., xj’s that are smaller
than δj1−β ) that were not needed in [7]. The rest of the results in this paper are new.
Consider the following definition of a stationary round:
Definition 4.11. (Stationary round.) Let S− = {j : xj decreases}. A round is stationary if it happens after
the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln(
1
δmin
) and τ1 = 1β2 ln(nAmax), and both of the following two
conditions hold:
1.
∑
j∈S− wjxj
1−α ≤ γ∑nj=1wjxj1−α, and
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2.
∑n
j=1 xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij ≤ (1 + 5γ/4)
∑n
j=1wjxj
1−α
.
In the rest of the proof, we first show that in any stationary round, we have an O(ε)−approximate
solution, while in any non-stationary round, the potential function increases substantially.
We first prove the following lemma, which we will then be used in bounding the duality gap.
Lemma 4.12. After the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln( 1δmin ) and τ1 = 1β2 ln(nAmax), in each
round of the algorithm: ξj(x) ≡ xj
α
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
> 1− 5γ4 , ∀j.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that the algorithm starts with a feasible solution. This assumption
is w.l.o.g. because, from Lemma 4.5, after at most τ1 rounds the algorithm reaches a feasible solution, and
from Lemma 4.4, once the algorithm reaches a feasible solution, it always maintains a feasible solution.
Choose any j. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.4, after at most 1β ln(
1
δj
) ≤ τ0
rounds, there exists at least one round in which ξj(x) > 1− γ (otherwise xj > 1, which is a contradiction).
Observe that in any round for which ξj(x) ≤ 1− γ, xj increases by a factor 1+β1 = 1+β. Therefore,
the maximum number of consecutive rounds in which ξj(x) ≤ 1 − γ is at most 1β ln( 1δj ) ≤ τ0, otherwise
xj would increase to a value larger than 1, making x infeasible, which is a contradiction due to Lemma 4.4.
The maximum amount by which ξj(x) can decrease in any round is bounded by a factor 1− γ4 · βln(1/δmin) =
1− γ4 · 1τ0 . Therefore, using the generalized Bernoulli’s inequality, it follows that in any round:
ξj(x) ≥ (1− γ) ·
(
1− γ
4
· 1
τ0
)τ0 ≥ (1− γ) · (1− γ
4
)
> 1− 5γ
4
.
A simple corollary of Lemma 4.12 is that:
Corollary 4.13. After the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln( 1δmin ) and τ1 = 1β2 ln(nAmax), in each
round of the algorithm: ∑j xj∑i yi(x)Aij > (1− 5γ4 )∑j wjxj1−α.
Proof. From Lemma 4.12, after the initial τ0+ τ1 rounds, it always holds ξj(x) ≡ xj
α
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
≥ 1− 5γ4 ,
∀j. Multiplying both sides of the inequality by wjxj1−α, ∀j and summing over j, the result follows.
Recall that pα(x) ≡
∑
j wjfα(xj) denotes the primal objective. The following lemma states that any
stationary round holds an (1 + 6ε)-approximate solution.
Lemma 4.14. In any stationary round: p(x∗) ≤ (1 + 6ε)p(x), where x∗ is the optimal solution to (Pα).
Proof. Since, by definition, a stationary round can only happen after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, we have that
x in that round is feasible, and also from Lemma 4.6:
∑
i yi ≤ (1 + 3ε)
∑
j xj
∑
i yi(x)Aij . Therefore,
recalling Eq. (2) for the duality gap and denoting ξj(x) = xj
α
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
, we have that:
p(x∗)− p(x) ≤ G(x, y(x)) =
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
ξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+
∑
i
yi(x)−
∑
j
wjxj
1−αξ
− 1−α
α
j
=
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+
∑
i
yi(x)
≤
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+ (1 + 3ε)
∑
j
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij . (25)
From Lemma 4.12, ξj > 1− 5γ4 , ∀j. Partition the indices of all the variables as follows:
S1 =
{
j : ξj ∈
(
1− 5γ
4
, 1 +
5γ
4
)}
, S2 =
{
j : ξj ≥ 1 + 5γ
4
}
.
Then, using (25):
p(x∗)− p(x) ≤ G1(x) +G2(x),
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where:
G1(x) =
∑
j∈S1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+ (1 + 3ε)
∑
j∈S1
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij
and
G2(x) =
∑
j∈S2
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+ (1 + 3ε)
∑
j∈S2
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij .
The rest of the proof follows by upper-bounding G1(x) and G2(x).
Bounding G1(x). Observing that ∀j: xj
∑
i yi(x)Aij = wjxj
1−αξj , we can write G1(x) as:
G1(x) =
∑
j∈S1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j + (1 + 3ε)(1 − α)ξj − 1
)
. (26)
Denote r(ξj) = αξ
− 1−α
α
j + (1 + 3ε)(1 − α)ξj − 1. It is simple to verify that r(ξj) is a convex function.
Since ξj ∈
(
1− 5γ4 , 1 + 5γ4
)
, ∀j ∈ S1, it follows that r(ξj) < max{r(1− 5γ/4), r(1 + 5γ/4)}. Now:
r(1− 5γ/4) = α
(
1− 5γ
4
)− 1−α
α
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε)
(
1− 5γ
4
)
− 1
< α
(
1− 5γ
4
)− 1−α
α
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε)− 1.
If 1−αα ≤ 1, then as (1− 5γ/4)−1 ≤ (1 + 2γ), it follows that (1− 5γ/4)−
1−α
α ≤ 1 + 2γ. Therefore:
r(1− 5γ/4) < α(1 + 2γ) + (1− α)(1 + 3ε) − 1
= 2γα + 3 · (1− α)ε = αε
2
+ 3 · (1− α)ε
= 3ε
(
1− 5
6
α
)
. (27)
If 1−αα > 1, then (using generalized Bernoulli’s inequality and ε ≤ α1−α ):
r(1− 5γ/4) < α 1
(1 − 5γ/4) 1−αα
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε)− 1
≤ α 1
1− 5γ4 · 1−αα
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε) − 1
≤ α
(
1 +
5γ
4
· 1− α
α
)
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε)− 1
≤ (1− α)
(5γ
4
+ 3ε
)
< 4ε(1 − α). (28)
On the other hand:
r(1 + 5γ) = α
(
1 +
5γ
4
)− 1−α
α
+ (1− α)(1 + 3ε)
(
1 +
5γ
4
)
− 1
< α+ (1− α)(1 + 4ε) − 1
= 4ε(1 − α). (29)
Combining (27)–(29) with (26):
G1(x) < 4ε ·
∑
j∈S1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α . (30)
Bounding G2(x). Because the round is stationary and S2 ⊆ S−, we have that:
∑
j∈S2 wjxj
1−α ≤
17
γ
∑n
j=1wjxj
1−α
. Using the second part of the stationary round definition and that
∑
j∈S2 xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij >
(1− 5γ/4)∑j∈S2 wjxj1−α (follows from Lemma 4.12):∑
j∈S2
xj
m∑
i=1
yi(x)Aij =
m∑
k=1
xk
m∑
i=1
yi(x)Aik −
∑
l /∈S2
xl
m∑
l=1
yl(x)Alk
≤ (1 + 5γ/4)
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α − (1− 5γ/4)
∑
l /∈S2
wlxl
1−α
≤ (1 + 5γ/4)
∑
j∈S2
wjxj
1−α +
5γ
2
∑
l /∈S2
wlxl
1−α
≤ γ(1 + 5γ/4)
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α +
5γ
2
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α
< 4γ
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α = ε
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α. (31)
Above, first inequality follows from
∑m
k=1 xk
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aik ≤ (1 + 5γ/4)
∑n
k=1wkxk
1−α (part 2 of the
stationary round definition) and Corollary 4.13. Second inequality follows by breaking the left summation
into two summations: those with j ∈ S2 and those with l /∈ S2. The third inequality follows from S2 ⊆ S
and part 1 of the stationary round definition.
Observe that as ξj ≥ 1 + 5γ/4 > 1, we have that ξ−
1−α
α
j < 1. Using (31), it follows that:
G2(x) =
∑
j∈S2
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
αξ
− 1−α
α
j − 1
)
+ (1 + 3ε)
∑
j∈S2
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij
< (α− 1)
∑
j∈S2
wj
xj
1−α
1− α + (1 + 3ε)
∑
j∈S2
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij
≤ (α− 1)
∑
j∈S2
wj
xj
1−α
1− α + ε(1 + 3ε)
n∑
k=1
wkxk
1−α
≤ −(1− α)
∑
j∈S2
wj
xj
1−α
1− α +
3
2
ε(1− α)
n∑
k=1
wk
xk
1−α
1− α
<
3
2
ε(1 − α)
n∑
k=1
wk
xk
1−α
1− α
< 2ε
n∑
k=1
wk
xk
1−α
1− α . (32)
Finally, combining (30) and (32):
p(x∗)− p(x) <
(
4ε+ 2ε
) ∑
j∈S1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
= 6εp(x).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. From Lemma 4.14, in any stationary round: p(x∗) ≤ p(x)(1 + 6ε). Therefore, to
prove the theorem, it suffices to show that there are at most O
(
1
α2ε5
ln2 (RwmnAmax) ln
2
(
Rw
mnAmax
ε
))
non-stationary rounds in total, where Rw = wmax/wmin, because we can always run the algorithm for
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ε′ = ε/6 to get an ε−approximation, and this would only affect the constant in the convergence time.
To bound the number of non-stationary rounds, we will show that the potential increases by a “large
enough” multiplicative value in all the non-stationary rounds in which the potential is not too “small”. For
the non-stationary rounds in which the value of the potential is “small”, we show that the potential increases
by a large enough value so that there can be only few such rounds.
In the rest of the proof, we assume that the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds have passed, so that x is feasible, and
the statement of Lemma 4.6 holds. This does not affect the overall bound on the convergence time, as
τ0 + τ1 =
1
β
ln
( 1
δmin
)
+
1
β2
ln(nAmax) = O
(
1
β2
ln(nAmax) ln
( 1
δmin
))
= O
(
1
αε4
ln(nAmax) ln
2
(
Rw
mnAmax
ε
)
ln (RwmnAmax)
)
. (33)
To bound the minimum and the maximum values of the potential Φ, we will bound
∑
j wj
xj1−α
1−α and
1
κ
∑
i yi(x). Recall that Φ(x) =
∑
j wj
xj
1−α
1−α − 1κ
∑
i yi(x).
Since δj =
(
wj
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1
α ≥
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1
α
, x is always feasible, and xj ≤ 1, ∀j, we have
that:
W
1− α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
≤
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α ≤
W
1− α, (34)
and
0 <
1
κ
∑
i
yi(x) ≤ Cm
κ
. (35)
Thus, we have:
Φmin ≥ −1
κ
∑
i
yi(x)
≥ −1
κ
·m · C
≥ −O(m2n2Amaxwmax), (36)
and
Φmax ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
1
1− α =
W
1− α. (37)
Recall from Lemma 4.9 that the potential never decreases. We consider the following three cases for the
value of the potential:
Case 1: Φmin ≤ Φ ≤ −Θ( wminAmax ). Since in this case Φ < 0, we have that
∑
i yi(x) > κ
∑
j wj
xj
1−α
1−α . From
Lemma 4.6,
∑
j xj
∑
i yi(x)Aij ≥ (1− 3ε)
∑
j wj
xj1−α
1−α , thus implying:∑
j
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij ≥ 1− 3ε
κ
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α ≥ 2 ·
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α , (38)
as κ ≥ 1ε and ε ≤ 16 . Combining Part 3 of Lemma 4.10 and (38), the potential increases by at least:
Ω
(
β2
ln(1/δmin)
)∑
j
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij =
(
β2
ln(1/δmin)
)∑
i
yi(x) =
(
β2
ln(1/δmin)
· κ
)
(−Φ(x))
= Ω
(
γ2
κ ln(1/δmin)
)
(−Φ(x)).
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Since the potential never decreases, there can be at most
O
(
κ ln(1/δmin)
γ2
ln
( −Φmin
wmin/Amax
))
= O
(
1
α
1
ε3
ln2 (RwnmAmax) ln
(
Rw
nmAmax
ε
))
Case 1 rounds.
Case 2: −O( wminAmax ) < Φ ≤ O( W1−α · ( wmin2wmaxn2mAmax ) 1−αα ). From Lemma 4.6, there exists at least one i
such that
∑
j Aijxj ≥ 1 − (1 + 1/κ)ε. Since Aij ≤ Amax ∀i, j, it is also true that
∑
j xj ≥ 1−(1+1/κ)εAmax ,
and as xj1−α ≥ xj and κ ≥ 1ε , it follows that
∑
j wjxj
1−α ≥ (1 − ε(1 + ε))
(
wmin
Amax
)
. From (34), we also
have
∑
j wj
xj
1−α
1−α ≥ W1−α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
. Therefore:
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
1− α ≥ max
{
(1− ε(1 + ε)) 1
1 − α ·
wmin
Amax
,
W
1− α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
}
. (39)
If Φ ≤ 110 ·max
{
(1− ε(1 + ε)) 11−α · wminAmax , W1−α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
}
, then∑
i
yi(x) ≥ 9
10
κ · 1
1− α
∑
j
wjxj
α
≥ 9
10
κ ·max
{
(1− ε(1 + ε)) 1
1 − α
wmin
Amax
,
W
1− α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
}
.
From Lemma 4.6,∑
i
yi(x)
∑
j
Aijxj ≥ (1− 3ε)
∑
i
yi(x)
≥ (1− 3ε) 9
10
κ ·max
{
(1− ε(1 + ε)) 1
1− α ·
wmin
Amax
,
W
1− α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
}
.
From the third part of Lemma 4.10, the potential increases additively by at least
Ω
(
β2κ
ln(1/δmin)
)
·max
{
1
1− α ·
wmin
Amax
,
W
1− α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
)1−α
α
}
,
and, therefore, Φ = Ω
(
W
1−α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
)
after at most
O
(
ln(1/δmin)κ
γ2
)
= O
(
1
α
1
ε3
ln (RwnmAmax) ln
(
Rw
nmAmax
ε
))
rounds.
Case 3: Ω
(
W
1−α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α
)
≤ Φ ≤ W1−α . In this case, Φ = O
(∑
j wj
xj
1−α
1−α
)
. If the round is
stationary, then from Lemma 4.14, p(x∗) ≤ (1+6ε)p(x). If the round is not stationary, then from Definition
4.11, either:
1.
∑
k∈S− wkxk
1−α > γ
∑n
j=1wjxj
1−α
, or
2.
∑n
j=1 xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij > (1 +
5γ
4 )
∑n
j=1wjxj
1−α
.
If the former is true, then using the first part of Lemma 4.10, the potential increases by at least Ω
(
β2γ
ln(1/δmin)
)
·∑
j wjxj
1−α = Ω
(
β2γ
ln(1/δmin)
)
·(1−α)Φ. If the latter is true, from the third part of Lemma 4.10, the potential
increases by at least Ω
(
β2γ
ln(1/δmin)
)
·∑j wjxj1−α = Ω( β2γln(1/δmin)) · (1 − α)Φ. It follows that there are at
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most
O
 1
1− α ·
ln(1/δmin)
β2γ
ln
 W1−α
W
1−α ·
(
wmin
2wmaxn2mAmax
) 1−α
α

= O
(
1
α2
1
ε5
ln2 (Rw ·mnAmax) ln2
(
Rw · mnAmax
ε
))
non-stationary Case 3 rounds.
Combining the three cases with the bound on τ0 + τ1 (33), the total convergence time is at most:
O
(
1
α2ε5
ln2 (RwmnAmax) ln
2
(
Rw · mnAmax
ε
))
rounds, as claimed.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof outline for the convergence of α-FAIRPSOLVER in the α = 1 case is as follows. First, we show
that in any round it cannot be the case that only “small” xj’s (i.e., xj’s that are smaller than δj1−β ) decrease.
In fact, we show that the increase in the potential due to updates of “small” variables is dominated by the
increase in the potential due to those variables that decrease multiplicatively by a factor (1− β2) = (1− β)
(Lemmas 4.15 and 4.16). We then define a stationary round and show that: (i) in any non-stationary round
the potential increases significantly, and (ii) in any stationary round, the solution x at the beginning of the
round provides an additive 5Wε–approximation to the optimum objective value.
Lemma 4.15. Starting with a feasible solution, in any round of the algorithm:
1.
∑
{k∈S−:xk≥ δk1−β }
xk
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aik ≥ 12
∑
j∈S− xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij .
2.
∑
{k∈S−:xk≥ δk1−β }
xk
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aik
wk
≥ 12
∑
j∈S−
xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
.
Proof. Fix any round, and let x0, y(x0) and x1, y(x1) denote the values of x, y at the beginning and at the
end of the round, respectively. If for all j ∈ S− x0j ≥ δj1−β , there is nothing to prove.
Suppose that there exists some x0j <
δj
1−β that decreases. Then from Lemma 4.7 there exists at least one
i ∈ {1, ...,m} such that Aij 6= 0, and:
• ∑nk=1Aikx0k > 1− ε2 , and
• yi(x) ≥
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
mAmax
> (1− β)wjδj 1mAmax
x0j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
.
Since
∑n
k=1Aikx
0
k > 1 − ε2 , there exists at least one p such that Aipx0p >
1− ε
2
n . Recalling that C =
wj
δj
≥
2wmaxn
2mAmax:
(x0p)Aipyi(x
0) > C · (1− β)
mAmax
· 1−
ε
2
n
· x
0
j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
> 2wmaxn
2mAmax · (1− β)
mAmax
· 1−
ε
2
n
· x
0
j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ 2nwmax(1− β)
(
1− ε
2
)
· x
0
j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ nwmax
x0j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
. (40)
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Since xj decreases, it must be
x0j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ 1 + γ. Using (40):
x0p
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
≥ (x
0
p)Aipyi(x
0)
wmax
≥ nx
0
j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ 1 + γ,
and, therefore, xp decreases as well. Moreover, since (40) implies
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp ≥
∑
{j∈S−:xj< δj1−β∧Aij 6=0}
wmax
wj
x0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj ≥
∑
{j∈S−:xj< δj1−β∧Aij 6=0}
x0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj ,
the proof of the first part of the lemma follows. The second part follows from (40) as well, since:
x0p
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
≥ (x
0
p)Aipyi(x
0)
wmax
≥ nx
0
j
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
,
which, given that xj was chosen arbitrarily, implies:
x0p
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
≥
∑
{j∈S−:xk< δk1−β∧Aik 6=0}
x0k
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wk
.
Lemma 4.16. Let x0, y(x0) and x1, y(x1) denote the values of x, y at the beginning and at the end of any
fixed round, respectively. If x0 is feasible, then the potential increase in the round is at least:
1. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ)∑j∈S+ wj;
2. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β)
(
(1− γ)W −∑nj=1 x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij).
3. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(β)
(∑n
j=1 x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij − (1 + γ)W
)
.
Proof.
Proof of 1: Recall that:
Φ(x1)−Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
x1j − x0j
x1j
(
1− x
1
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
≥
∑
j∈S+
wj
x1j − x0j
x1j
(
1− x
1
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
.
Let ξj(x1) =
x1j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
, ξj(x
0) =
x0j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
.
If j ∈ S+, then x1j = (1+β)x0j and ξj(x0) ≤ 1−γ. Since from the choice of parameters ξj increases by
at most a factor of 1+γ/4, it follows that: ξj(x1) ≤ (1−γ)(1+γ/4) ≤ 1− 34γ, which gives 1−ξj(x1) ≥ 34γ.
Therefore:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β
1 + β
· 3
4
γ ·
∑
j∈S+
wj .
Proof of 2: The proof is equivalent to the proof of the second part of Lemma 4.10 and is omitted.
Proof of 3: Using that for j ∈ S− we have that x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
≥ 1 + γ and x1j = max{(1 − β)x0j , δj},
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we can lower bound the increase in the potential as:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
x1j − x0j
x1j
(
1− x
1
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
)
=
β
1− β
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
(x1j∑mi=1 yi(x1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
≥ β
1− β
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
(
(1− γ/4)x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− 1
)
≥ β
1− β (1− γ/4)
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
(x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
. (41)
Now consider k ∈ S− such that x0k < δk1−β . From the proof of Lemma 4.15, for each such xk there
exists a constraint i and a variable xp ≥ δp1−β with p ∈ S− such that Aik 6= 0, Aip 6=0, x0p
∑
l yl(x
0)Alp ≥
n · x0k
∑
l yl(x
0)Alk, and
x0p
∑
l yl(x
0)Alp
wp
≥ n · x0k
∑
l yl(x
0)Akp
wk
. If wk ≤ wp then
wp
(x0p∑l yl(x0)Alp
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ wk
(
n · x
0
k
∑
l yl(x
0)Akp
wk
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ n · wk
(x0k∑l yl(x0)Akp
wk
− (1 + γ)
)
.
On the other hand, if wk > wp, then:
wp
(x0p∑l yl(x0)Alp
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
= (x0p
∑
l
yl(x
0)Alp − (1 + γ)wp)
> n · x0k
∑
l
yl(x
0)Akp − (1 + γ)wk
≥ n · wk
(x0k∑l yl(x0)Akp
wk
− (1 + γ)
)
.
It follows from (41) that:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β
1− β
1− γ/4
2
∑
j∈S−
wj
(x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
.
Finally, since for j /∈ S− we have that x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
< 1 + γ:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ β
1− β
1− γ/4
2
n∑
j=1
wj
(x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
= Ω(β)
( n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij − (1 + γ)
n∑
j=1
wj
)
.
Consider the following definition of a stationary round:
Definition 4.17. A round is stationary if it happens after the initial τ0+τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln(1/δmin),
τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax) and if both of the following conditions hold:
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• ∑j∈S+ wj ≤W/τ0;
• (1− 2γ)W ≤∑nj=1 xj∑mi=1 y(x)Aij ≤ (1 + 2γ)W .
We first show that in any non-stationary round there is a sufficient progress towards the ε−approximate
solution.
Lemma 4.18. In any non-stationary round the potential function increases by at least Ω(βγ ·W/τ0).
Proof. A round is non-stationary if either of the two conditions from Definition 4.17 does not hold. If the
first condition does not hold, then from the first part of Lemma 4.16, the potential increases by Ω(βγ ·W/τ0).
If the second condition does not hold, then from either the second or the third part of Lemma 4.16 the
potential increases by at least Ω(βγW ) ≥ Ω(βγ ·W/τ0).
Before proving that in every non-stationary round, the solution is O(ε)−approximate, we will need the
following intermediary lemma.
Lemma 4.19. Starting with a feasible solution and after at most τ0 = 1β ln
(
1
δmin
)
rounds, in any round of
the algorithm:
min
j
xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
≥ (1− γ)τ0 .
Proof. First, we claim that after the algorithm reaches a feasible solution it takes at most τ0 + 1 additional
rounds for each agent j to reach a round in which xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
> 1 − γ. Suppose not, and pick any
agent k for which in each of the τ0 + 1 rounds following the first round that holds a feasible solution:
xk
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aik
wk
≤ 1− γ. Then xk increases in each of the rounds and after 1β ln( 1δk ) ≤ τ0 rounds we have
xk ≥ 1. Therefore, after at most τ0 + 1 rounds the solution becomes infeasible, which is a contradiction
(due to Lemma 4.4).
Now choose any xj and observe ξj =
xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
over the rounds that happen after the first τ0 + 1
rounds. The maximum number of consecutive rounds for which ξj ≤ 1 − γ is τj = 1β ln( 1δj ) ≤ τ0,
otherwise we would have xj > 1, a contradiction. Since in any round, due to the choice of the algorithm
parameters, ξj decreases by at most a factor of 1 − γ/4, the minimum value that ξj can take is at least
(1− γ)(1− γ/4)τj/2 > (1− γ)τ0 , thus completing the proof.
Now we are ready to prove that a solution in a stationary round is O(ε)−approximate.
Lemma 4.20. In any stationary round: p1(x∗)− p1(x) ≤ 5εW , where x∗ is the optimal solution.
Proof. Since, due to Definition 4.17, a stationary round can only happen after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, we
have that in any stationary round the solution is feasible (Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5) and approximate comple-
mentary slackness (Lemma 4.6) holds.
Recall the expression for the duality gap:
G1(x, y) = −
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −W.
From the second part of Lemma 4.6:
m∑
i=1
yi ≤ (1 + 3ε)
n∑
j=1
xj
m∑
i=1
yiAij .
Therefore:
G1(x, y) ≤ −
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)
+ (1 + 3ε)
n∑
j=1
xj
m∑
i=1
yiAij −W.
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Since the round is stationary, we have that
∑n
j=1 xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij ≤ (1 + 2γ)W , which gives:
G1(x, y) ≤ −
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)
+ 4εW. (42)
Let ξj =
xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
. The remaining part of the proof is to bound−∑nj=1wj ln(ξj) ≤ −∑j:ξj<1 wj ln(ξj).
For ξj ∈ (1 − γ, 1), we have that −wj ln(ξj) ≤ γwj . To bound the remaining terms, we will use Lemma
4.19 and the bound of the sum of the weights wj for which ξj ∈ S+ (that is, ξj ≤ 1− γ). It follows that:
−
n∑
j=1
wj ln(ξj) ≤ −
∑
k:ξk∈(1−γ,1)
wk ln(ξk)−
∑
l∈S+
wl ln(ξl)
≤ γ
∑
k:ξk∈(1−γ,1)
wk − ln
(
(1− γ)τ0
)
·
∑
l∈S+
wl (from Lemma 4.19)
≤ γW + τ0γ · W
τ0
= 2γW
=
ε
2
W. (43)
Combining (42) and (43), and recalling that p1(x∗)− p1(x) ≤ G1(x, y(x)), the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Consider the values of the potential in the rounds following the initial τ0+τ1 rounds,
where τ0 = 1β ln(1/δmin), τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax) (so that the solution x is feasible in each round and the
approximate complementary slackness holds). Observe that τ0 + τ1 = o
(
ln2(nmAmaxRw) ln
2(nmAmaxε Rw)
ε5
)
.
We start by bounding the minimum and the maximum values that the potential can take. Recall (from
Lemma 4.9) that the potential never decreases.
Due to Lemma 4.4, xj ∈ [δj , 1], ∀j, and therefore we can bound the two summations in the potential as:∑
j
wj ln(xj) ≥
∑
j
wj ln(δj) = −O
(
W · ln
(wmax
wmin
nmAmax
))
, (44)
∑
j
wj ln(xj) ≤
∑
j
wj ln(1) ≤ 0, (45)
− 1
κ
∑
i
yi(x) ≥ −mC
κ
· e0 > −mC = −O(wmaxn2m2Amax), (46)
and
− 1
κ
∑
i
yi(x) < −mC
κ
· e−κ < 0. (47)
From (44) and (46):
Φmin ≥ −O(wmaxn2m2Amax). (48)
On the other hand, from (45) and (47):
Φmax < 0. (49)
Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: 1κ
∑
i yi(x) ≥ W · ln
(
e · wmaxwmin nmAmax
)
. Then 1κ
∑
i yi(x) ≤ −Φ(x) ≤ 2κ
∑
i yi(x) and
1
κ
∑
i yi(x) ≥W . From the third part of Lemma 4.6, we have that
∑
j xj
∑
i yi(x)Aij ≥ (1−3ε)
∑
i yi(x) ≥
25
2W . Thus using the Part 2 of Lemma 4.16, we get that the potential increases by
Ω(β) ·
∑
j
xj
∑
i
yi(x)Aij = Ω
(
β ·
∑
i
yi(x)
)
= Ω(βκ) · (−Φ(x)).
Finally, since βκ = Θ(γ), there can be at most O
(
1
γ ln
(
RwnmAmax
W ln(RwnmAmax)
))
Case 1 rounds.
Case 2: 1κ
∑
i yi(x) < W · ln
(
e · wmaxwmin nmAmax
)
. Then −2W · ln
(
e · wmaxwmin nmAmax
)
< Φ(x) < 0.
From Lemma 4.20, if a round is stationary, then p(x∗) − p(x) ≤ 5εW . If a round is non-stationary, from
Lemma 4.18, the potential increases (additively) by at least Ω(βγ ·W/τ0). Therefore, the maximum number
of non-stationary rounds is at most:
O
(
W ln(nmAmaxwmax/wmin)
βγW/τ0
)
= O
(
1
β2γ
· ln2 (RwnmAmax)
)
= O
(
ln2 (RwnmAmax) ln
2
(
Rw
nmAmax
ε
)
ε5
)
.
Combining the results for the Case 1 and Case 2, the theorem follows by invoking α-FAIRPSOLVER for the
approximation parameter ε′ = ε/5.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
The outline of the proof of Theorem 4.3 is as follows. First, we show that in any round of the algorithm
the variables that decrease by a multiplicative factor (1 − β2) dominate the potential increase due to all the
variables that decrease (Lemma 4.21). This result is then used in Lemma 4.22 to show the appropriate lower
bound on the potential increase. Observe that for α > 1 the objective function pα(x), and, consequently,
the potential function Φ(x) is negative for any feasible x. To yield a poly-logarithmic convergence time in
Rw,m, n, and Amax, the idea is to show that the negative potential −Φ(x) decreases by some multiplicative
factor whenever x is not a “good” approximation to x∗ – the optimal solution to (Pα). This idea, combined
with the fact that the potential never decreases (and therefore −Φ(x) never increases) and with upper and
lower bounds on the potential then leads to the desired convergence time.
Lemma 4.21. In any round of the algorithm in which the solution x0 at the beginning of the round is
feasible: ∑
{
j:j∈S−∧x0j≥
δj
1−β
}x
0
j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij ≥ 1
2
∑
j∈S−
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij ;
and ∑
{
j:j∈S−∧x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
(
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
≥ 1
2
∑
j∈S−
(
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
.
Proof. If x0j ≥ δj1−β , ∀j, there is nothing to prove, so assume that there exists at least one j with x0j < δj1−β .
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that for each j for which xj decreases by a factor less than
(1−β) there exists at least one xp that appears in at least one constraint i in which xj appears and decreases
by a factor (1− β). We then proceed to show that xp is in fact such that
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp = Ω(n)x
0
j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj
26
and
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp − (1 + γ)wp(x0p)1−α = Ω(n)
(
x0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
.
This will then imply that the terms x0p
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp and x0p
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp−(1+γ)wp(x0p)1−α dominate
the sum of all the terms corresponding to xj’s with Aij 6= 0 and xj < δj1−β , thus completing the proof.
From Lemma 4.7, for each j ∈ S− with xj < δj1−β there exists at least one constraint i such that:
• ∑nk=1Aikx0k > 1− ε2 , and
• yi(x0) ≥
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
mAmax
⇒ yi(x0) > (1− β)α 1mAmax
wj
δj
α
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1 yi(x
0)Alj
wj
.
Therefore, there exists at least one xp with Aip 6= 0 such that Aipx0p > 1−
ε
2
n , which further gives Aip(x
0
p)
α >
(1− ε
2
)α
nα · Aip1−α ≥
(1− ε
2
)α
nα · Amax1−α, where the last inequality follows from 1 ≤ Aip ≤ Amax and α > 1.
Combining the inequality for Aip(x0p)α with the inequality for yi(x0) above:
(x0p)
α
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp ≥ (x0p)αAipyi(x0)
≥ (1−
ε
2)
α
nα
· Amax1−α(1− β)α 1
mAmax
wj
δj
α
(x0j)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
= C · (1−
ε
2)
α
nαmAmax
α (1− β)α
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
(from C = wj
δαj
)
≥ 2nwmax(1− β)α
(
1− ε
2
)α (x0j )α∑ml=1 yl(x0)Alj
wj
(from C ≥ 2wmaxnα+1mAmax2α−1).
Using the generalized Bernoulli’s inequality:
(
1− ε2
)α
> 1 − εα2 and (1 − β)α > (1 − βα) [37], and
recalling that εα ≤ 910 , β ≤ γε5 = ε
2
20 ≤ ε120 , we further get:
(x0p)
α
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp ≥ 2nwmax
(
1− 9
10 · 120
)(
1− 9
20
)
· (x
0
j )
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ nwmax
(x0j)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
,
which further implies:
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
≥ n · (x
0
j)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
, (50)
as wp ≤ wmax. Since xj decreases, (x
0
j )
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
≥ 1 + γ, and therefore xp decreases as well.
Using similar arguments, as Aipx0p >
1− ε
2
n and recalling that yi(x
0) ≥ 1mAmax
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x
0) >
1
mAmax
1−β
δj
· x0j
∑m
l=1Aljyl(x
0):
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp ≥ x0pAipyi(x0) ≥
1− ε2
n
1
mAmax
1− β
δj
· x0j
m∑
l=1
Aljyl(x
0)
≥ nx0j
m∑
l=1
Aljyl(x
0), (51)
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as δj ≤ 121/αn2mAmax and 2
1/α(1− ε2)(1− β) ≥ 2
10
9
ε(1− ε2)(1− ε
2
20 ) ≥ 1 (since ε ∈ (0, 1/6]).
From (51), it follows that
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp ≥
∑
{k∈S−:xk< δk1−β∧Aik 6=0}
x0k
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alk,
which further implies the first part of the lemma.
For the second part, consider the following two cases:
Case 1: wp(x0p)1−α ≥ wj(x0j )1−α. Then:
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp − (1 + γ)wp(x0p)1−α = wp(x0p)1−α
(
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ wj(x0j)1−α
(
(x0p)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alp
wp
− (1 + γ)
)
≥ wj(x0j)1−α
(
n
(x0j)
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
(from (50))
≥ nwj(x0j )1−α
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
l=1 yl(x
0)Alj
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
= n
(
x0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
,
implying the second part of the lemma.
Case 2: wp(x0p)1−α < wj(x0j )1−α. Then:
x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp − (1 + γ)wp(x0p)1−α > x0p
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alp − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
≥ nx0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α (from (51))
≥ n
(
x0j
m∑
l=1
yl(x
0)Alj − (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
,
thus implying the second part of the lemma and completing the proof.
The following lemma lower-bounds the increase in the potential, in each round.
Lemma 4.22. Let x0 and x1 denote the values of x before and after any fixed round, respectively, and let
S+ = {j : x1j > x0j}, S− = {j : x1j < x0j}. The potential increase in the round is lower bounded as:
1. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ)∑j∈{S+∪S−} x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij;
2. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω
(
β
(1−β)α
)(∑n
j=1 x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)− (1 + γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j )1−α);
3. Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω
(
β
(1+β)α
)(
(1− γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j )1−α −∑nj=1 x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)).
Proof.
Proof of 1. From Lemma 4.9:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
|x1j − x0j |
(x1j )
α
∣∣∣∣∣1− (x1j )α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let ξj(x1) =
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
. From the proof of Lemma 4.9, if x1j − x0j > 0, then 1 − ξj(x1) ≥
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3
4γ ≥ 34γξj(x1), as 0 < ξj(x1) ≤ 1 − 34γ. If x1j − x0j < 0, then 1 − ξj(x1) ≤ −γ2 , which implies
1 ≤ ξj(x1)(1 + γ2 )−1, and thus 1 − ξj(x1) ≤ ξj(x1)((1 + γ/2)−1 − 1) = ξj(x1) −γ/21+γ/2 < −ξj(x1)γ/23/2 =
−γ3 ξj(x1). Therefore: |1− ξj(x1)| ≥ γ3 ξj(x1)⇔
∣∣∣∣1− (x1j )α ∑mi=1 yi(x1)Aijwj
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ3 (x1j )α∑mi=1 yi(x1)Aijwj , which
further gives:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
n∑
j=1
wj
|x1j − x0j |
(x1j )
α
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≥ γ
3
n∑
j=1
|x1j − x0j | ·
m∑
i=1
yi(x
1)Aij .
If j ∈ S+, then x1j = (1+β)x0j , and therefore |x1j−x0j |·
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij =
(
1− 11+β
)
x1j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij ≥(
1− γ4
) β
1+βx
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij .
Similarly, if j ∈ S− and x0j ≥ δj1−β , then x1j = (1 − β)x0j , and therefore |x1j − x0j | ·
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij =(
1
1−β − 1
)
x1j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij ≥
(
1− γ4
) β
1−βx
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij . Using part 1 of Lemma 4.21:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ γ
6
β
1 + β
∑
j∈{S+∪S−}
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij .
Proof of 2: Consider j ∈ S− such that x0j ≥ δj1−β . Then x1j = (1 − β)x0j ,
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
≥ (1 + γ),
and using Lemma 4.9:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
|x1j − x0j |
(x1j)
α
∣∣∣∣∣1− (x1j)α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj
β
(1− β)α (x
0
j )
1−α
(
(x1j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
1)Aij
wj
− 1
)
≥ β
(1− β)α
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj(x
0
j )
1−α
(
(1− γ/4)(x
0
j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− 1
)
≥ (1− γ/4) β
(1 − β)α
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
wj(x
0
j)
1−α
(
(x0j )
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aij
wj
− (1 + γ)
)
= (1− γ/4) β
(1 − β)α
∑
{j∈S−:x0j≥
δj
1−β
}
(
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)− (1 + γ)wj(x0j )1−α
)
.
Using the second part of Lemma 4.21 and the fact that for k /∈ S−: (x0k)α
∑m
i=1 yi(x
0)Aik
wk
< (1 + γ), we get
the desired result:
Φ(x1)−Φ(x0) ≥ 1
2
(1− γ/4) β
(1 − β)α
 n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)− (1 + γ)
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j)
1−α
 .
Proof of 3: The proof is equivalent to the proof of Lemma 4.10, part 2, and is omitted for brevity.
Consider the following definition of a stationary round:
Definition 4.23. (Stationary round.) A round is stationary, if both:
1.
∑
j∈{S+∪S−} x
0
j
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij ≤ γ
∑n
j=1wj(x
0
j)
1−α
, and
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2. (1− 2γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j)1−α ≤∑nj=1 x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij
hold, where S+ = {j : x1j > x0j}, S− = {j : x1j < x0j}. Otherwise, the round is non-stationary.
The following two technical propositions are used in Lemma 4.26 for bounding the duality gap in sta-
tionary rounds.
Proposition 4.24. After the initial the initial τ0+τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln(1/δmin), τ1 = 1β ln(nAmax), it
is always true thatGα(x, y(x)) ≤
∑n
j=1wj
x1−αj
α−1
(
1+(1+3ε)(α−1)ξj−αξ
α−1
α
j
)
, where ξj =
xαj
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
.
Proof. Recall from (2) that the duality gap for x, y in (Pα) is given as:
Gα(x, y) =
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
((
wj
xjα
∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
− 1
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi−
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j ·
(
xj
α
∑n
j=1Aijyi
wj
)α−1
α
.
From Lemma 4.6, after at most initial τ0 + τ1 rounds:
m∑
i=1
yi ≤ (1 + 3ε)
n∑
j=1
xj
m∑
i=1
yiAij
= (1 + 3ε)
n∑
j=1
wjxj
1−α ·
(
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)
,
and letting ξj =
xjα
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
, we get:
Gα(x, y) ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
(
ξ
α−1
α
j − 1 + (1 + 3ε)(1 − α)ξj − (1− α)ξ
α−1
α
j
)
=
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
(
αξ
α−1
α
j + (1 + 3ε)(1 − α)ξj − 1
)
=
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξj − αξ
α−1
α
j
)
.
Proposition 4.25. Let rα(ξj) =
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξj − αξ
α−1
α
j
)
, where ξj =
xjα
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
. If α > 1
and ξj ∈ (1 − γ, 1 + γ) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}, then rα(ξj) ≤ ε(3α − 2).
Proof. Observe the first and the second derivative of rα(ξj):
drα(ξj)
dξj
= (α− 1)(1 + 3ε− ξ−1/αj );
d2rα(ξj)
dξj
2 =
1
α
(α− 1)ξj−1/α−1.
As ξj > 0, r(ξj) is convex for α > 1, and therefore: r(ξj) ≤ max{r(1− γ), r(1 + γ)}. We have that:
r(1− γ) = r(1− ε/4) = 1−
(
1− ε
4
)
((1 − α)(1 + 3ε) + α(1− ε/4)−1/α)
≤ 1−
(
1− ε
4
)
(1− α+ 3ε(1 − α) + α(1 + ε/4)1/α)
≤ 1−
(
1− ε
4
)
(1 + ε/4 + 3ε(1− α)) (from (1 + ε/4)1/α ≥ 1 + ε/(4α))
= 1− 1− ε
4
+ 3ε(α− 1) + ε
4
(1 + ε/4− 3ε(α − 1))
30
=
ε2
16
+ 3ε(α − 1)
(
1− ε
4
)
≤ ε(3α − 2).
On the other hand:
r(1 + γ) = r(1 + ε/4) = 1−
(
1 +
ε
4
)
((1− α)(1 + 3ε) + α(1 + ε/4)−1/α)
≤ 1−
(
1 +
ε
4
)
(1− α+ 3ε− 3εα + α(1− ε/4)1/α)
≤ 1−
(
1 +
ε
4
)(
1 +
11
4
ε− 3εα
)
≤ 1−
(
1 +
11
4
ε− 3εα
)
≤ ε(3α − 2),
completing the proof.
The following lemma states that in any stationary round current solution is an (1+ε(4α−1))-approximate
solution.
Lemma 4.26. In any stationary round that happens after the initial the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where τ0 =
1
β ln(1/δmin), τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax), we have that pα(x
∗) − pα(x) ≤ ε(4α − 1)(−pα(x)), where x∗ is the
optimal solution to (Pα) and x is the solution at the beginning of the round.
Proof. Observe that for any k /∈ {S+ ∪ S−} (by the definition of S+ and S−) we have that 1 − γ <
xαk
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aik
wk
< 1 + γ, which is equivalent to:
(1− γ)wkx1−αk < xk
m∑
i=1
yi(x)Aik < (1 + γ)wkx
1−α
k ∀k /∈ {S+ ∪ S−}. (52)
Using stationarity and (52):
(1− 2γ)
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j ≤
n∑
j=1
xj
n∑
i=1
yi(x)Aij
=
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
xl
n∑
i=1
yi(x)Ail +
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
xk
n∑
i=1
yi(x)Aik
< γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j + (1 + γ)
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wkx
1−α
k . (53)
Since
∑
l∈{S+∪S−} wlx
1−α
l =
∑n
j=1wjx
1−α
j −
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}wkx
1−α
k , using (53):
(1− 2γ)
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wlx
1−α
l < γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j + (1 + γ)
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wkx
1−α
k − (1− 2γ)
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wkx
1−α
k
= γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j + 3γ
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wkx
1−α
k
≤ 4γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j ,
and therefore: ∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wlx
1−α
l <
4γ
1− 2γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j < 5γ
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j , (54)
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as γ = ε4 and ε ≤ 16 .
As pα(x∗)− pα(x) ≤ G(x, y(x)), from Proposition 4.24:
pα(x
∗)− pα(x) ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξj − αξ
α−1
α
j
)
=
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wk
x1−αk
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξk − αξ
α−1
α
k
)
+
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξl − αξ
α−1
α
l
)
.
From Proposition 4.25:∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wk
x1−αk
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξk − αξ
α−1
α
k
)
≤ ε(3α − 2)
∑
k/∈{S+∪S−}
wk
x1−αk
α− 1
≤ ε(3α − 2)
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
α− 1
= ε(3α − 2)(−pα(x)). (55)
Observe
∑
l∈{S+∪S−} wl
x1−αl
α−1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξl − αξ
α−1
α
l
)
. Since α > 1, each wl
x1−αl
α−1 > 0, and
therefore: ∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξl − αξ
α−1
α
l
)
≤
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1 ((1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξl + 1)
=
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1
(
(1 + 3ε)(α − 1)x
α
l
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Ail
wl
+ 1
)
= (1 + 3ε)
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
xl
m∑
i=1
yi(x)Ail +
∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1 .
Now, from stationarity
∑
l∈{S+∪S−} xl
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Ail < γ
∑n
j=1wjx
1−α
j and using (54) we get:∑
l∈{S+∪S−}
wl
x1−αl
α− 1
(
1 + (1 + 3ε)(α − 1)ξj − αξ
α−1
α
j
)
<
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
α− 1(γ(1 + 3ε)(α − 1) + 5γ)
≤ −pα(x)
(
3ε
8
α+ ε
)
. (56)
Finally, combining (55) and (56): pα(x∗)− pα(x) < ε(4α − 1)(−pα(x)).
The following two lemmas are used for lower-bounding the potential increase in non-stationary rounds.
Lemma 4.27. Consider any non-stationary round that happens after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where
τ0 =
1
β ln(1/δmin), τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax). Let x
0 and x1 denote the values of x before and after the round
update. If 1κ
∑
i y(x
0) ≥ −∑j wj (x0j )1−α1−α , then Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(γ3)(−Φ(x0)).
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Proof. Observe that as 1κ
∑
i y(x
0) ≥ −∑j wj (x0j )1−α1−α ,
−Φ(x0) ≤ 2 · 1
κ
∑
i
y(x
0) ≤ 2(1 − 3ε)
κ
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.6.
Since the round is not stationary, we have that either:
1.
∑
j∈S−∪S+ x
0
j
∑
i yi(x)Aij > γ
∑n
j=1wj(x
0
j )
1−α
, or
2. (1− 2γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j)1−α >∑nj=1 x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij .
Case 1:
∑
j∈S−∪S+ x
0
j
∑
i yi(x)Aij > γ
∑n
j=1wj(x
0
j )
1−α
. If:
n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0) ≤ (1 + 2γ)
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j )
1−α,
then ∑
j∈S−∪S+
x0j
∑
i
yi(x)Aij >
γ
1 + 2γ
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij = Ω(γ)
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij ,
and, from the first part of Lemma 4.22, the potential increase is lower bounded as:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ2)
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij
= Ω(βκγ2)(−Φ(x0))
= Ω(γ3)(−Φ(x0)).
On the other hand, if:
n∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0) > (1 + 2γ)
n∑
j=1
wj(x
0
j )
1−α,
then, from the second part of Lemma 4.22:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ)
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij
= Ω(βγκ)(−Φ(x0))
= Ω(γ2)(−Φ(x0)).
Case 2: (1−2γ)∑nj=1wj(x0j )1−α >∑nj=1 x0j∑mi=1 yi(x0)Aij . Then, using the third part of Lemma 4.22:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω
(
β
(1 + β)α
γ
)∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij
= Ω(βγ)
∑
j=1
x0j
m∑
i=1
yi(x
0)Aij
= Ω(βγκ)(−Φ(x0))
= Ω(γ2)(−Φ(x0)),
where in the second line we have used that β(1+β)α = Θ(β). This can be shown using the generalized
Bernoulli’s inequality and εα ≤ 910 as follows:
1
(1 + β)α
≥ (1− 2β)α ≥ 1− 2αβ = 1− α
k + α
· ε
10
≥ 1− 9
100
= Θ(1).
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Lemma 4.28. Consider any non-stationary round that happens after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds, where
τ0 =
1
β ln(1/δmin), τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax). Let x
0 and x1 denote the values of x before and after the round
update. If 1κ
∑
i y(x
0) < −∑j wj (x0j )1−α1−α , then Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω (βγ2) (α− 1)(−Φ(x0)).
Proof. Observe that as 1κ
∑
i y(x
0) < −∑j wj (x0j )1−α1−α ,
−Φ(x0) ≤ −2
∑
j
wj
(x0j )
1−α
1− α =
2
α− 1
∑
j
wj(x
0
j)
1−α
.
From the definition of a stationary round, we have either of the following two cases:
Case 1:
∑
j∈{S+∪S−} xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij > γ
∑n
j=1wjx
1−α
j . From the first part of Lemma 4.22, the in-
crease in the potential is: Φ(x1) − Φ(x0) ≥ Ω (βγ2)∑nj=1wjx1−αj . As −Φ(x0) ≤ 2α−1∑j wj(x0j)1−α,
the increase in the potential is at least:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ2)(α− 1)(−Φ(x0)).
Case 2: (1 − 2γ)∑nj=1wjx1−αj > ∑nj=1 xj∑mi=1 yi(x)Aij . Using part 3 of Lemma 4.22, the increase in
the potential is then Φ(x1) − Φ(x0) ≥ Ω
(
β
(1+β)α γ
)∑n
j=1wjx
1−α
j . Therefore, using that
β
(1+β)α = Θ(β)
as in the proof of Lemma 4.27:
Φ(x1)− Φ(x0) ≥ Ω(βγ)(α − 1)(−Φ(x0)).
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We will bound the total number of non-stationary rounds that happen after the initial
τ0+τ1 rounds, where τ0 = 1β ln(1/δmin), τ1 =
1
β ln(nAmax). The total convergence time is then at most the
sum of τ0 + τ1 rounds and the number of non-stationary rounds that happen after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds,
since, from Lemma 4.26, in any stationary round: p(x∗)− p(x) ≤ ε(4α − 1)(−p(x)).
Consider the non-stationary rounds that happen after the initial τ0 + τ1 rounds. As xj ∈ [δj , 1], ∀j, it is
simple to show that:
W
α− 1 ≤
∑
j
wj
xj
1−α
α− 1 ≤
W
α− 1 · 2Rw
α−1
α n2(α−1)mα−1Amax2α−1, (57)
and
0 <
1
κ
∑
i
yi(x) ≤ mC
κ
≤ εmC. (58)
Recall that Φ(x) = −∑j wj xj1−αα−1 − 1κ∑i yi(x) and that the potential Φ(x) never decreases.
There can be two cases of non-stationary rounds: those in which
∑
j wj
xj1−α
α−1 dominates in the absolute
value of the potential, and those in which 1κ
∑
i yi(x) dominates in the absolute value of the potential. We
bound the total number of the non-stationary rounds in such cases as follows.
Case 1: 1κ
∑
i yi(x) ≥
∑
j wj
xj
1−α
α−1 . From (57) and (58), in any such round, the negative potential is
bounded as:
Ω
(
W
α− 1
)
≤ −Φ(x) ≤ O (εmC) .
Moreover, from Lemma 4.27, in each Case 1 non-stationary round, the potential increases by at least
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Ω(γ3)(−Φ(x)). It immediately follows that there can be at most:
O
(
1
γ3
ln
(
εmC
W
α−1
))
= O
(
1
γ3
ln ((α− 1)εRwnmAmax)
)
= O
(
1
ε3
ln (RwnmAmax)
)
(59)
Case 1 non-stationary rounds, as (α− 1)ε < αε ≤ 910 .
Case 2: 1κ
∑
i yi(x) <
∑
j wj
xj1−α
α−1 . From (57) and (58), in any such round, the negative potential is
bounded as:
Ω
(
W
α− 1
)
≤ −Φ(x) ≤ O
(
W
α− 1 · Rw
α−1
α n2(α−1)mα−1Amax2α−1
)
.
Moreover, from Lemma 4.21, in each such non-stationary round the potential increases by at least Ω
(
βγ2
)
(α−
1)(−Φ(x0)). Therefore, there can be at most:
O
(
1
βγ2(α− 1) ln
(
W
α−1 · Rw
α−1
α n2(α−1)mα−1Amax2α−1
W
α−1
))
= O
(
1
βγ2
ln(Rw
1
αnmAmax)
)
= O
(
1
ε4
ln(RwnmAmax) ln
(
Rw · nmAmax
ε
))
(60)
Case 2 non-stationary rounds.
The total number of initial τ0 + τ1 rounds can be bounded as:
τ0 + τ1 =
1
β
ln(1/δmin) +
1
β
ln(nAmax)
= O
(
1
ε2
ln (RwnmAmax) ln
(
Rw · nmAmax
ε
))
. (61)
Combining (59), (60), and (61), the total convergence time is at most:
O
(
1
ε4
ln (Rw · nmAmax) ln
(
Rw · nmAmax
ε
))
.
Finally, running α-FAIRPSOLVER for the approximation parameter ε′ = ε/(4α− 1), we get that in any
stationary round pα(x∗)− pα(x) ≤ −εpα(x), while the total number of non-stationary rounds is at most:
O
(
α4
ε4
ln (Rw · nmAmax) ln
(
Rw · nmAmax
ε
))
.
4.4 Structural Properties of α−Fair Allocations
Lower Bound on the Minimum Allocated Value. Recall (from Section 2) that the optimal solution x∗
to (Pα) must lie in the positive orthant. We show in Lemma 4.29 that not only does x∗ lie in the positive
orthant, but the minimum element of x∗ can be bounded below as a function of the problem parameters.
This lemma motivates the choice of parameters δj in α-FAIRPSOLVER (Section 3).
Lemma 4.29. Let x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x∗n) be the optimal solution to (Pα). Then ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
• x∗j ≥
( wj
wmaxM
mini:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
)1/α
, if 0 < α ≤ 1,
• x∗j ≥ Amax(1−α)/α
( wj
wmaxM
)1/α
mini:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
, if α > 1,
where ni =
∑n
j=1 1{Aij 6=0}
7 is the number of non-zero elements in the ith row of the constraint matrix A,
7With the abuse of notation, 1{e} is the indicator function of the expression e, i.e., 1 if e holds, and 0 otherwise.
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and M = min{m,n}.
Proof. Fix α. Let:
µj(α) =

(
wj
wmaxM
mini:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
)1/α
, if α ≤ 1
Amax
(1−α)/α
(
wj
wmaxM
)1/α
mini:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
, if α > 1
.
For the purpose of contradiction, suppose that x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x∗n) is the optimal solution to (Pα), and
x∗j < µj(α) for some fixed j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
To establish the desired result, we will need to introduce additional notation. We first break the set of
(the indices of) constraints of the form Ax ≤ 1 in which variable xj appears with a non-zero coefficient into
two sets, U and T :
• Let U denote the set of the constraints from (Pα) that are not tight at the given optimal solution x∗,
and are such that Au,j 6= 0 for u ∈ U . Let su = 1−
∑n
k=1Aukxk denote the slack of the constraint
u ∈ U .
• Let T denote the set of tight constraints from (Pα) that are such that Atj 6= 0 for t ∈ T . Observe that
since x∗ is assumed to be optimal, T 6= ∅.
Let εj = min
{
µj(α)− x∗j ,minu∈U su/Auj
}
. Notice that by increasing xj to x∗j + εj none of the
constraints from U can be violated (although all the constraints in T will; we deal with these violations in
what follows).
In each constraint t ∈ T , there must exist at least one variable xk such that x∗k >
1
ntAtk
, because∑n
l=1Atlx
∗
l = 1, as each t ∈ T is tight, and x∗j < µj(α) ≤ mini:Aij 6=0 1niAij ≤ 1ntAtj . Select one such xk
in each constraint t ∈ T , and denote by K the set of indices of selected variables. Observe that |K| ≤ |T |
(≤M ), since an xk can appear in more than one constraint.
For each k ∈ K , let Tk denote the constraints in which xk is selected, and let
εk = max
t∈Tk :Atk 6=0
Atjεj
Atk
. (62)
If we increase xj by εj and decrease xk by εk ∀k ∈ K , each of the constraints t ∈ T will be satisfied since,
from (62) and from the fact that only one xk gets selected per constraint t ∈ T , εjAtj −
∑
k∈K εkAtk ≤ 0.
Therefore, to construct an alternative feasible solution x′, we set x′j = x∗j + εj , x′k = x∗k − εk for k ∈ K ,
and x′l = x∗l for all the remaining coordinates l ∈ {1, ..., n}\(K ∪ {j}).
Since j is the only coordinate over which x gets increased in x′, all the constraints Ax′ ≤ 1 are satisfied.
For x′ to be feasible, we must have in addition that x′k ≥ 0 for k ∈ K . We show that x′k = x∗k − εk ≥ 0 as
follows:
εk = εj · max
t∈Tk :Atk 6=0
Atj
Atk
≤ µj(α) · max
t∈Tk:Atk 6=0
Atj
Atk
≤ min
i:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
· max
t∈Tk :Atk 6=0
Atj
Atk
≤ max
t∈Tk:Atk 6=0
1
ntAtj
Atj
Atk
≤ max
t∈Tk:Atk 6=0
1
ntAtk
< x∗k,
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where the second line follows from εj ≤ µj(α) − x∗j ≤ µj(α), and the last line follows from the choice of
xk.
The last part of the proof is to show that
∑n
l=1 wl
x′l−x∗l
x∗l
α > 0, which contradicts the initial assumption
that x∗ is optimal, by the definition of α-fairness from Section 2. We have that:
n∑
l=1
wl
x′l − x∗l
x∗l
α = wj
εj
x∗j
α −
∑
k∈K
wk
εk
x∗k
α
=
∑
k∈K
(
wj
εj
x∗j
α|K| − wk
εk
x∗k
α
)
=
∑
k∈K
(
wjεjx
∗
k
α − wkεkx∗jα|K|
x∗j
αx∗k
α|K|
)
. (63)
Consider one term from the summation (63). From the choice of εk’s, we know that for each εk there exist
t ∈ T such that εk = εjAtj
Atk
, and at the same time (by the choice of xk) we have x∗k >
1
ntAtk
, so that
wjεjx
∗
k
α > wj
εkAtk
Atj
(
1
Atknt
)α
>
wkwjεk
wmax
Atk
Atj
(
1
Atknt
)α
. (64)
Case 1. Suppose first that α ≤ 1. Then x∗kα >
(
1
Atknt
)α
≥ 1Atknt , as Atk 6= 0 ⇒ Atk ≥ 1. Plugging into
(64), we have:
wjεjx
∗
k
α >
wkwjεk
wmax
1
ntAtj
. (65)
By the initial assumption, x∗j < µj(α) =
(
wj
wmaxM
mini:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
)1/α
, and therefore
wkεkx
∗
j
α|K| < wkwjεk
wmax
|K|
M
min
i:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
≤ wkwjεk
wmax
1
ntAtj
, (66)
since it must be |K| ≤ M (= min{m,n}). From (65) and (66), we get that every term in the summation
(63) is strictly positive, which implies:
n∑
l=1
wl
x′l − x∗l
x∗l
α > 0,
and therefore x∗ is not optimal.
Case 2. Now suppose that α > 1. Then
x∗j < µj(α) = Amax
(1−α)/α
(
wj
wmaxM
)1/α
min
i:Aij 6=0
1
niAij
≤ Amax(1−α)/α
(
wj
wmaxM
)1/α 1
ntAtj
.
Therefore:
wkεkx
∗
j
α|K| < wkεk wj
wmaxM
Amax
1−α
(
1
ntAtj
)α
|K|
≤ wk wj
wmax
Amax
1−αεk
(
1
Atknt
)α Atkα
Atj
α
= wk
wj
wmax
εkAtk
Atj
· (Atk/Atj)
α−1
Amax
α−1
(
1
Atknt
)α
≤ wk wj
wmax
εkAtk
Atj
(
1
Atknt
)α
, (67)
as |K| ≤M , and AtkAtj ≤ Amax (since for any i, j: 1 ≤ Aij ≤ Amax).
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Finally, from (64) and (67) we get that every term in the summation (63) is positive, which yields a
contradiction.
Asymptotics of α−Fair Allocations The following lemma states that for sufficiently small (but not
too small) α, the values of the linear and the α−fair objectives at their respective optimal solutions are
approximately the same. This statement will then lead to a conclusion that to ε−approximately solve an
α−fair packing problem for a very small α, one can always use an ε−approximation packing LP algorithm.
Lemma 4.30. Let (Pα) be an α−fair packing problem with optimal solution x∗, and (P0) be the LP with
the same constraints and the same weights w as (Pα) and an optimal solution z∗. Then if α ≤ ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) ,
we have that
∑
j wjz
∗
j ≥ (1− 3ε)
∑
j
(x∗j )
1−α
1−α , where ε ∈ (0, 1/6].
Proof. The proof outline is as follows. First, we show that the α−fair objective pα(x∗) can be upper-
bounded by a linear objective as pα(x∗) ≡
∑
j wj
x∗j
1−α
1−α ≤ (1 + O(ε))
∑
j wjx
∗
j . Then, to complete the
proof, we use the optimality of z∗ for the LP:
∑
j wjz
∗
j ≥
∑
j wjx
∗
j (≥ (1 − O(ε))
∑
j wj
x∗j
1−α
1−α from the
first part of the proof).
Let g(xj) =
xj
1−α
1−α − (1 + ε)xj . Consider the case when g(xj) ≤ 0. Solving g(xj) ≤ 0 for xj , we get
that it should be
xj ≥
( 1
1− α
)1/α · ( 1
1 + ε
)1/α
. (68)
Choose α so that 1
(1+ε)1/α
≤ ( ε/4nAmax ), which is equivalent to α ≤ ln(1+ε)ln(4nAmax/ε) . Then to have g(xj) ≤ 0,
it suffices to have xj ≥ εnAmax , because (i)
(
1
1−α
)1/α ∈ [e, 4] for α ∈ [0, 1/2], where e is the base of the
natural logarithm, and (ii) 1
(1+ε)1/α
≤ ( ε/4nAmax ) by the choice of α.
Now, as α ≤ ln(1+ε)ln(4nAmax/ε) , summing over j such that x∗j ≥ εnAmax we have:∑
j:x∗j≥ εnAmax
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α − (1 + ε)
∑
j:x∗j≥ εnAmax
wjx
∗
j =
∑
j:x∗j≥ εnAmax
wjg(x
∗
j ) ≤ 0 (69)
Now we bound the rest of the terms in pα(x∗), i.e., we consider j : x∗j < εnAmax . Observe that since
xj =
1
nAmax
for j = {1, ..., n} is a feasible solution to (Pα) and x∗ is the optimal solution to (Pα), we have
that
∑
j wj
(1/nAmax)1−α
1−α ≤
∑
j wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1−α , which gives:∑
j:x∗j<
ε
nAmax
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α < ε
1−α ∑
j:x∗j<
ε
nAmax
wj
(1/nAmax)
1−α
1− α
< ε1−α
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α
≤ 2ε
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α .
Therefore: ∑
j:x∗j≥ εnAmax
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α > (1− 2ε)
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α . (70)
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Combining (69) and (70), we now get:
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α <
1 + ε
1− 2ε ·
∑
j:x∗j≥ εnAmax
wjx
∗
j . (71)
Finally, since z∗ optimally solves (P0) (which has the same constraints and weights as (Pα)), we have that
x∗ is feasible for (P0), and using (71) and optimality of z∗, it follows that:
n∑
j=1
wjz
∗
j ≥
n∑
j=1
wjx
∗
j
≥ 1− 2ε
1 + ε
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α
≥ (1− 3ε)
n∑
j=1
wj
(x∗j )
1−α
1− α ,
as claimed.
Observing that for any α ∈ (0, 1), (z
∗
j )
1−α
1−α ≥ z∗j (since, due to the scaling, z∗j ∈ [0, 1]), a simple
corollary of Lemma 4.30 is that an ε−approximation z to (P0) (
∑
j wjzj ≥ (1 − ε)
∑
j wjz
∗
j ) is also an
O(ε)−approximation to (Pα), for α ≤ ε/4ln(nAmax/ε) . Thus, to find an ε−approximate solution for α ≤
ε/4
ln(nAmax/ε)
, the packing LP algorithm of [7] can be run, which means that there is a stateless distributed
algorithm that converges in poly(ln(ε−1RwmnAmax)/ε) time for α arbitrarily close to zero.
The following two lemmas show that when α is sufficiently close to 1, (Pα) can be ε−approximated by
ε−approximately solving (P1) with the same constraints and weights.
Lemma 4.31. Let x be an ε−approximate solution to a 1-fair packing problem (P1) returned by α-
FAIRPSOLVER. Then, for any α ∈ [1− 1/τ0, 1), where τ0 = 1β ln( 1δmin ), x is also a 2ε−approximate
solution to (Pα), where the only difference between (P1) and (Pα) is in the value of α in the objective.
Proof. Suppose that x is a solution in some stationary round, provided by α-FAIRPSOLVER run for α = 1.
Fix that round. It is clear that if x is feasible in (P1), it is also feasible in (Pα), since all the constraints in
(P1) and (Pα) are the same by the initial assumption. All that is required for a dual solution y to be feasible
is that yi ≥ 0, for all i, and therefore y(x) is a feasible dual solution for (Pα). The rest of the proof follows
by bounding the duality gap Gα(x, y(x)). Recall from (2) that:
Gα(x, y(x)) =
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
((xjα∑mi=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α − 1
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j ·
(xjα∑mi=1Aijyi
wj
)α−1
α
.
(72)
Since x is a solution from a stationary round, from the second part of the definition of a stationary round
(Definition 4.17), we have that:
n∑
j=1
xj
n∑
i=1
yi(x)Aij ≤ (1 + 2γ)
n∑
k=1
wk.
Further, from Lemma 4.6:
m∑
i=1
yi(x) ≤ (1 + 3ε)
n∑
j=1
xj
n∑
i=1
yi(x)Aij ≤ (1 + 3ε)(1 + 2γ)
n∑
k=1
wk. (73)
Next, we show that:
xj
1−α ≥ 1− γ, ∀j. (74)
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Rearranging the terms and taking logarithms of both sides in (74), we obtain the equivalent inequality
1 − α ≤ ln(1/(1−γ))ln(1/xj) . Recall from α-FAIRPSOLVER that in every (except for, maybe, the first) round
xj ≥ δj ≥ δmin. As ln(1/(1 − γ)) ≥ γ, it therefore suffices to show that 1− α ≤ γln(1/δmin) . But from the
statement of the lemma, 1− α ≤ 1/τ0 < γln(1/δmin) , completing the proof of (74).
Combining (73) and (74), we get that:
m∑
i=1
yi(x) ≤ (1 + 3ε)(1 + 2γ)
1− γ
n∑
j=1
wjxj
1−α ≤ (1 + 5ε)
n∑
j=1
wjxj
1−α, (75)
where the second inequality follows from ε ≤ 1/6, γ = ε/4.
Using (75), we can bound the duality gap (Eq. (72)) as:
Gα(x, y(x)) ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
α
(xjα∑mi=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α − 1 + (1 − α)(1 + 5ε)
)
. (76)
To complete the proof, recall from Lemma 4.19 that in any round of the algorithm, for all j: xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
≥
(1− γ)τ0 . As α < 1 and xj ∈ [0, 1], ∀j, it holds that xjα ≥ xj , ∀j, and therefore:
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
≥ (1− γ)τ0 , ∀j. (77)
Finally, recalling that 1− α ≤ 1/τ0, and combining (77) with (76), we get:
Gα(x, y(x)) ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
α
( 1
1− γ
)1/α − 1 + (1− α)(1 + 5ε))
≤
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α ((1 + 2γ)
1/α − 1 + (1− α)(1 + 5ε))
≤
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α (1 + ε− 1 + (1− α)(1 + 5ε))
≤ 2ε
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α ,
where the third inequality follows from α ≥ 1− 1/τ0 ≥ 1− γε5 ≥ 1− ε
2
20 , and the fourth inequality follows
from 1− α < ε/2 and ε ≤ 1/6.
Lemma 4.32. Let x be an ε−approximate solution to a 1-fair packing problem (P1) returned by α-
FAIRPSOLVER. Then, for any α ∈ (1, 1 + 1/τ0], where τ0 = 1β ln( 1δmin ), x is also a 2ε−approximate
solution to (Pα), where the only difference between (P1) and (Pα) is in the value of α in the objective.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.31, we will fix an x from some stationary round of α-FAIRPSOLVER
run on (P1), and argue that the same x 2ε−approximates (Pα) by bounding the duality gap Gα(x, y(x)),
although we will need to use a different set of inequalities since now α > 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma
4.31, as x is (primal-)feasible for (P1), x and y(x) are primal- and dual-feasible for (Pα).
By the same token as in the proof of Lemma 4.31:
m∑
i=1
yi(x) ≤ (1 + 3ε)(1 + 2γ)
n∑
j=1
wj .
As α > 1 and xj ∈ (0, 1], ∀j, we have that xj1−α ≥ 1, ∀j, and therefore:
m∑
i=1
yi(x) ≤ (1 + 3ε)(1 + 2γ)
n∑
j=1
wjxj
1−α ≤ (1 + 4ε)
n∑
j=1
wjxj
1−α. (78)
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Therefore, we can write for the duality gap:
Gα(x, y(x)) ≤
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
α
(xjα∑mi=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α − 1 + (1− α)(1 + 4ε)
)
(79)
= −
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
−α
(xjα∑mi=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α
+ 1 + (α− 1)(1 + 4ε)
)
. (80)
Notice that, as α > 1, the objective for (Pα),
∑n
j=1wj
xj1−α
1−α , is now negative.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.31, it is straightforward to show that xjα−1 ≥
1− γ, ∀j. From Lemma 4.19, we have that xj
∑
i yi(x)Aij
wj
≥ (1− γ)τ0 , ∀j, and therefore:
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
=
xj
1−α · xj
∑m
i=1 yi(x)Aij
wj
≥ (1− γ)τ0+1. (81)
Recalling that α− 1 ≤ 1/τ0 (by the statement of the lemma) and using (81), we have:(xjα∑mi=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α ≥ (1− γ)(τ0+1)/(τ0(1+1/τ0))
= (1− γ). (82)
Finally, plugging (82) into (80), we have:
Gα(x, y(x)) ≤ −
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α (−α(1− γ) + 1 + (α− 1)(1 + 4ε))
= −
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α
(
α · 1
4
ε+ 4ε(α − 1)
)
≤ −ε
n∑
j=1
wj
xj
1−α
1− α , (83)
where the equality follows from γ = ε4 , and the last inequality follows from α− 1 ≤ 1τ0 < ε20 .
Finally, we consider the asymptotics of α−fair allocations, as α becomes large. This result complements
the result from [38] that states that α−fair allocations approach the max-min fair one as α→∞ by showing
how fast the max-min fair allocation is reached as a function of α,Rw, n, and Amax. First, for completeness,
we provide the definition of max-min fairness.
Definition 4.33. (Max-min fairness [10].) Let R ⊂ Rn+ be a compact and convex set. A vector x ∈ R is
max-min fair onR if for any vector z ∈ R it holds that: if for some j ∈ {1, ..., n} zj > xj , then there exists
k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that zk < xk and xk ≤ xj .
On a compact and convex set R ⊂ Rn, the max-min fair vector is unique (see, e.g., [44, 45]). The
following lemma shows that for α ≥ ε−1 ln(RwnAmax), the α−fair vector and the max-min fair vector
are ε−close to each other. Notice that because of a very large gradient of pα(x) as α becomes large, the
max-min fair solution provides only an O(εα)−approximation to (Pα).
Lemma 4.34. Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (Pα) = max{pα(x) : Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0}, z∗ be the max-
min fair solution for the convex and compact set determined by the constraints from (Pα). Then if α ≥
ε−1 ln (RwnAmax), we have that:
1. pα(x∗) ≤ (1− ε(α− 1))pα(z∗), i.e., z∗ is an ε(α− 1)−approximate solution to (Pα), and
2. (1− ε)z∗j ≤ x∗j ≤ (1 + ε)z∗j , for all j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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Proof. Suppose that, starting with z∗, we want to construct a solution z that is feasible in (Pα) and is such
that pα(z) > pα(z∗). Then we need to increase at least one coordinate j of z∗. Suppose that we increase a
coordinate j by a factor 1+ε, so that zj = (1+ε)z∗j . Since z∗ is the max-min fair vector, to keep z feasible,
the increase over the jth coordinate must be at the expense of decreasing some other coordinates k that
satisfy z∗k ≤ z∗j . We will assume that whenever we decrease the coordinates to keep the solution feasible,
we keep the solution Pareto optimal (i.e., we decrease the selected coordinates by a minimum amount).
Using Fact 4.8, we have:
pα(z)− pα(z∗) ≤
n∑
l=1
wl
zl − z∗l
(z∗l )α
< wj
zj − z∗j
(z∗j )α
= ε · wj(z∗j )1−α. (84)
Now, suppose that we want to further increase the jth coordinate by some small δ. Call that new solution
z1. Then, the total amount by which other coordinates must decrease to keep the solution feasible is at
least δAmax , since the feasible region is determined by packing constraints and it must be Az ≤ 1, where
1 ≤ Aij ≤ Amax, ∀i, j. Moreover, since z∗ is max-min fair, each coordinate k that gets decreased must
satisfy z∗k ≤ z∗j . It follows that:
p(z1)− p(z) ≤
n∑
l=1
wl
z1l − zl
(zl)α
= wj
δ
(1 + ε)α(z∗j )α
+
∑
k:z1k<zk
wk
z1k − zk
(zk)α
≤ wmax δ
(1 + ε)α(z∗j )α
− wmin δ/Amax
(z∗j )α
=
δ(wmax − (1 + ε)αwmin/Amax)
(1 + ε)α(z∗j )α
≤ 0. (85)
The last inequality can be verified by solving the inequality wmax − (1 + ε)αwmin/Amax ≤ 0 for α, and
verifying that it is implied by the initial assumption that α ≥ ε−1 ln(RwnAmax).
Therefore, the maximum amount by which any coordinate of z∗ can be increased to improve the value
of the objective pα(.) is by a multiplicative factor of at most (1 + ε). Since we can construct x∗, the
optimal solution to (Pα), starting with z∗ and by choosing a set of coordinates j that we want to increase
and by only decreasing coordinates k such that z∗k ≤ z∗j whenever coordinate j is increased, it follows that
x∗j ≤ (1 + ε)z∗j , ∀j.
Moreover, from (84) and (85):
pα(z
1)− pα(z∗) = p(z1)− p(z) + p(z)− p(z∗) < ε · wj(z∗j )1−α,
and we can conclude that:
pα(x
∗)− pα(z∗) <
n∑
j=1
ε · wj(z∗j )1−α = ε(1− α) · pα(z∗),
which means that z∗ is an ε(α − 1)−approximate solution to (Pα).
Now consider the coordinates we need to decrease when we construct a solution z from z∗, such that
pα(z) > pα(z
∗). Suppose that to increase some other coordinates, a coordinate k is decreased by a factor
(1−ε): zk = (1−ε)z∗k . As z∗ is max-min fair, only coordinates larger than z∗k can increase at the expense of
decreasing z∗k . Suppose now that we decrease the kth coordinate further by some small δ. Call that solution
z1. Then the maximum number of other coordinates j that can further increase is min{n − 1,m} < n.
Moreover, each coordinate j that gets increased satisfies z∗j ≥ z∗k, and can be increased by at most Amaxδ.
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Using Fact 4.8, it follows that:
pα(z
1)− pα(z) ≤
n∑
l=1
wl
z1l − zl
(zl)α
= −wk δ
(1− ε)(z∗k)α
+
∑
j:z1j>zj
wj
z1j − zj
(z∗j )α
< −wmin δ
(1− ε)(z∗k)α
+ nwmax
Amaxδ
(z∗k)α
=
δ(nwmaxAmax(1− ε)α −wmin)
(z∗k)α
≤ 0, (86)
where the last inequality follows from (1−ε)α ≤ (RwnAmax)−1, which is implied by the initial assumption
that α ≥ ε−1ln(RwnAmax).
Therefore, using (86), the kth coordinate can decrease by at most a multiplicative factor (1 − ε). Using
similar arguments as for increasing the coordinates, it follows that x∗j ≥ (1− ε)z∗j , ∀j.
5 Conclusion
We presented an efficient stateless distributed algorithm for the class of α-fair packing problems. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm with poly-logarithmic convergence time in the input size. Addi-
tionally, we obtained results that characterize the fairness and asymptotic behavior of allocations in weighted
α−fair packing problems that may be of independent interest. An interesting open problem is to determine
the class of objective functions for which the presented techniques yield fast and stateless distributed al-
gorithms, together with a unified convergence analysis. This problem is especially important in light of
the fact that α-fair objectives are not Lipschitz continuous, do not have a Lipschitz gradient, and their dual
gradient’s Lipschitz constant scales at least linearly with n and Amax. Therefore, the properties typically
used in fast first-order methods are lacking [2, 40]. Finally, for applications of α-fair packing that do not
require uncoordinated updates, it seems plausible that the dependence on ε−1 in the convergence bound can
be improved from ε−5 to ε−3 by relaxing the requirement for asynchronous updates, similarly as was done
in [3] over [7].
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A Scaling Preserves Approximation
Let the α-fair allocation problem be given in the form:
(Qα) max
{ n∑
j=1
wjfα(xj) : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0
}
, where fα(xj) =
ln(xj), if α = 1x1−αj
1− α, if α 6= 1
,
w is an n−length vector of positive weights, x is the vector of variables, A is an n ×m constraint matrix,
and b is an m−length vector with positive entries. Denote pα(x) =
∑n
j=1wjfα(xj).
It is not hard to see that the assumption bi = 1 ∀i is without loss of generality, since for bi 6= 1 we can
always divide both sides of the inequality by bi and obtain 1 on the right-hand side, since for (non-trivial)
packing problems bi > 0. Therefore, we can assume that the input problem has constraints of the form
A · x ≤ 1, although it may not necessarily be the case that Aij ≥ 1 ∀Aij 6= 0.
The remaining transformation that is performed on the input problem is:
x̂j = c · xj , Âij = Aij/c.
where
c =
{
mini,j:Aij 6=0 Aij , if mini,j:Aij 6=0 Aij < 1
1, otherwise
.
The problem (Qα) after the scaling becomes:
max
n∑
j=1
wjfα(x̂j) · c1−α
s.t. Âx̂ ≤ 1
x̂ ≥ 0
⇔
(Pα) max
n∑
j=1
wjfα(x̂j)
s.t. Âx̂ ≤ 1
x̂ ≥ 0,
as c1−α is a positive constant. Recall that α-FAIRPSOLVER returns an approximate solution to (Pα), and
observe that x is feasible for (Qα) if and only if x̂ is feasible for (Pα).
Choose the dual variables (Lagrange multipliers) for the original problem (Qα) as:
yi = c
α−1C · eκ(
∑n
i=1Aijxj−1) = cα−1C · eκ(
∑n
i=1 Âij x̂j−1) = cα−1ŷi, (87)
and notice that
xj
α
m∑
i=1
yiAij = x̂
α
j · c−α ·
m∑
i=1
(cα−1 · ŷi · c · Âij) = x̂αj
m∑
i=1
ŷiÂij . (88)
It is clear that yi’s are feasible dual solutions, since the only requirement for the duals is non-negativity.
A.1 Approximation for Proportional Fairness
Recall (from (2)) that the duality gap for a given primal- and dual-feasible x and y is given as:
G(x, y) =
n∑
j=1
wj ln(wj)−
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
xj
m∑
i=1
yiAij
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi − 1.
Since α = 1, we have that ŷi = yi for all i, and using (88), it follows that
G(x̂, ŷ) = G(x, y).
Since we demonstrate an additive approximation for the proportional fairness via the duality gap: p(x̂∗) −
p(x̂) ≤ G(x̂, ŷ), the same additive approximation follows for the original (non-scaled) problem.
A.2 Approximation for α-Fairness and α 6= 1
For α 6= 1, we show that the algorithm achieves a multiplicative approximation for the scaled problem. In
particular, we show that after the algorithm converges we have that: pα(x̂∗) − pα(x̂) ≤ rαpα(x̂), where x̂∗
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is the optimal solution, x̂ is the solution returned by the algorithm, and rα is a constant.
Observe that since x̂ = c · x, we have that pα(x̂∗) = c1−αp(x∗) and pα(x̂) = c1−αpα(x). Therefore:
pα(x
∗)− pα(x) = cα−1(pα(x̂∗)− pα(x̂))
≤ cα−1 · rαpα(x̂)
= rαpα(x).
B Primal, Dual, and the Duality Gap
B.1 Proportionally Fair Resource Allocation
In this section we consider (w, 1)-proportional resource allocation, often referred to as the weighted propor-
tionally fair resource allocation. Recall that the primal is of the form:
(P1) max
n∑
j=1
wj ln(xj)
s.t. Ax ≤ 1,
x ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as:
L1(x; y, z) =
n∑
j=1
wj ln(xj) +
m∑
i=1
yi ·
1− n∑
j=1
Aijxj − zi
 ,
where y1, ..., ym are Lagrange multipliers, and z1, ..., zm are slack variables. The dual to this problem is:
(D1) min g(y)
s.t. y ≥ 0,
where g(y) = maxx,z≥0 L(x; y, z). To maximize L1(x; y, z), we first differentiate with respect to xj ,
j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
∂L1(x; y, z)
∂xj
=
wj
xj
−
m∑
i=1
yiAij = 0,
which gives:
xj ·
m∑
i=1
yiAij = wj, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}. (89)
Plugging this back into the expression for L1(x; y, z), and noticing that, since yi, zi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m},
L1(x; y, z) is maximized for zi = 0, we get that:
g1(y) =
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
wj∑m
i=1 yiAij
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
m∑
i=1
yi
n∑
j=1
Aijwj∑m
k=1 ykAkj
=
n∑
j=1
wj ln(wj)−
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
m∑
i=1
yiAij
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
wj
m∑
i=1
yiAij∑m
k=1 ykAkj
=
n∑
j=1
wj ln(wj)−
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
m∑
i=1
yiAij
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −W,
since
∑m
i=1
yiAij∑m
k=1 ykAkj
= 1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}, and ∑nj=1wj = W .
Let p1(x) =
∑n
j=1wj ln(xj) denote the primal objective. The duality gap for any pair of primal-feasible
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x and dual-feasible (nonnegative) y is given by:
G1(x, y) = g1(y)− p1(x)
= −
n∑
j=1
wj ln
(
xj
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −W.
Since the primal problem maximizes a concave function over a polytope, the strong duality holds [13], and
therefore G1(x, y) ≥ 0 for any pair of primal-feasible x and dual-feasible y, with equality if and only if x
and y are primal- and dual- optimal, respectively.
B.2 α-Fair Resource Allocation for α 6= 1
Recall that for α 6= 1 the primal problem is:
(Pα) max
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α ≡ pα(x)
s.t. Ax ≤ 1,
x ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as:
Lα(x; y, z) =
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α +
m∑
i=1
yi
1− n∑
j=1
Aijxj − zi
 ,
where yi and zi, for i ∈ {1, ...,m}, are Lagrangian multipliers and slack variables, respectively.
The dual to (Pα) can be written as:
(Dα) min g(y)
s.t. y ≥ 0,
where gα(y) = maxx,z≥0Lα(x; y, z).
Since Lα(x; y, z) is differentiable with respect to xj for j ∈ {1, ..., n}, it is maximized for:
∂Lα(x; y, z)
∂xj
=
wj
xjα
−
m∑
i=1
yiAij = 0
⇒ wj = xjα
m∑
i=1
yiAij . (90)
As zi · yi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we get that:
gα(y) =
n∑
j=1
wj
1− α
(
wj∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
m∑
i=1
yi
n∑
j=1
Aij
(
wj∑m
k=1 ykAkj
)1/α
=
n∑
j=1
wj
1− α
(
wj∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
w
1/α
j
(
m∑
k=1
ykAkj
)−1/α m∑
i=1
Aijyi
=
n∑
j=1
wj
1− α
(
wj∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
w
1/α
j
(
m∑
i=1
Aijyi
)α−1
α
.
Similarly as before, for primal-feasible x and dual-feasible y, the duality gap is given as:
Gα(x, y) = gα(y)− pα(x)
48
=n∑
j=1
wj
1− α
(
wj∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
w
1/α
j
(
m∑
i=1
Aijyi
)α−1
α
−
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
=
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
((
wj
xjα
∑m
i=1 yiAij
) 1−α
α
− 1
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi −
n∑
j=1
w
1/α
j
(
m∑
i=1
Aijyi
)α−1
α
.
Observing that:
w
1/α
j
(
m∑
i=1
Aijyi
)α−1
α
= wj · wj−
α−1
α · x1−αj · x
αα−1
α
j ·
(
m∑
i=1
Aijyi
)α−1
α
= wjx
1−α
j ·
(
xj
α
∑m
i=1Aijyi
wj
)α−1
α
,
we finally get:
Gα(x, y) =
n∑
j=1
wj
x1−αj
1− α
((
xj
α
∑m
i=1 yiAij
wj
)α−1
α
− 1
)
+
m∑
i=1
yi−
n∑
j=1
wjx
1−α
j ·
(
xj
α
∑m
i=1Aijyi
wj
)α−1
α
.
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